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I. INTRODUCTION
Interest-free and low-interest loans have gained increasing
popularity in light of high interest rates, a depressed economy, and
courts' refusal to tax such transactions. Taxpayers utilize below-
market loans1 to accomplish a variety of objectives. A corporation
may distribute the benefit of its profits to shareholders or a share-
holder might contribute to the capital of the corporation through a
below-market loan. An employer may compensate an employee for
past or future services with a below-market loan to finance a move
or a purchase. A parent may use a below-market loan to subsidize
a child's business venture or simply to shift income to a child.
Each situation raises numerous tax issues. Has the borrower
received income? Has the lender made a gift to the borrower? Does
the lender receive imputed interest income upon repayment? If so,
* Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School, B.A. 1972, University of Minne-
sota, J.D. 1978, University of Minnesota.
1. The term "below-market loan" used in this article encompasses both interest-free
and low-interest loans. Newly enacted I.R.C. § 7872 (West Supp. 1985) [I.R.C. hereinafter
cited only by "§"] employs this term and defines it to include both demand loans where
"interest is payable on the loan at a rate less than the applicable Federal rate" and term
loans where "the amount loaned exceeds the present value of all payments due under the
loan." Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, PUB. L. No. 98-369, § 172(a), 98 Stat. 494, 699 (to be
codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7872(e)(1)). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(a), 50 Fed. Reg.
33553, at 33558 (Aug. 20, 1985).
1
Willbanks: Interest-free Loans Are No Longer Free: Tax Consequences of Gift Loans
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
may the borrower claim an interest deduction? Will the employer
be entitled to a deduction for compensation?
Until recently, courts,2 with minor exceptions,3 had answered
these questions in favor of taxpayers and refused to impose either
income or gift taxes on the economic benefit of using the lender's
money at below-market rates. Despite these repeated rejections,
the Internal Revenue Service continued to assert that below-mar-
ket loans produced both income and gift tax consequences. The
Supreme Court finally resolved the gift tax issue in Dickman v.
Commissioner,4 where it held that a taxpayer loaning money inter-
est-free, payable on demand, made a gift of the reasonable value of
the right to use that money.
Congress responded in the Tax Reform Act of 19841 by enact-
ing section 7872 which provides comprehensive taxation of below-
market loans. Section 7872 treats below-market loans as if they
were made at a statutory rate of interest. The exact tax conse-
quences of a below-market loan depend on its form-whether it is
a term loan or a demand loan-and its context-whether it is a
corporation-shareholder loan, a compensation-related loan, or a
gift loan.
This article analyzes the tax implications of gift loans, particu-
larly the gift tax consequences. It assumes that the below-market
loan is a bona fide loan. When a taxpayer loans money under cir-
cumstances suggesting that he has no intention of demanding re-
payment or under a preconceived plan to forgive payments, the is-
sue becomes whether he has made a gift of the principal amount,
not just the interest component.6
Part II examines the concept of a gift and the tax conse-
quences which flow from that label. In doing so, it reviews the his-
tory and purpose of the gift tax and concludes that section 7872
2. See, e.g., Dean v. Comm'r, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961) (no income); Johnson v. United
States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966) (no gift); Crown v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977),
aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978) (no gift); Zager v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), aff'd sub.
nom., Martin v. Comm'r, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981) (no income); Greenspun v. Comm'r,
72 T.C. 931 (1979), aff'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982) (no income); Marsh v. Comm'r, 73
T.C. 317 (1979) (no income); Baker v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 166 (1980), aff'd, 677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.
1982) (no income); Dickman v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 620 (1980) (no gift); Suttle v.
Comm'r, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980) (no income); Beaton v. Comm'r, 664 F.2d 315 (1st
Cir. 1981) (no income).
3. Dickman v. Comm'r, 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984)
(gift); Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
4. Dickman v. Comm'r, 104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984).
5. PuB. L. No. 98-369.
6. E.g., Estate of Lang v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 404 (1975), aftrd, 613 F.2d 770 (9th Cir.
1980); Rev. Rul. 77-299, 1979-2 C.B. 343.
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correctly imposes a gift tax on below-market loans. Part III of the
article explores the difficulty of valuing the right to use property at
less than market rates. It discusses what should be measured and
at what rates. Part IV examines the issue of applying tax measures
retroactively. Although section 7872 applies only to loans made af-
ter June 6, 1984, Congress specifically refused to provide relief to
taxpayers from the Service's retroactive application of Dickman.
II. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF Gir LOANS
New section 7872 applies to all below-market gift loans ex-
ceeding specific monetary limits. 7 It provides that such loans are to
be taxed as if made at a statutory rate of interest and accompanied
by the transfer from the lender to the borrower and the retransfer
from the borrower to the lender of the amount of foregone inter-
est.8 As a result, both lenders and borrowers face potential tax con-
sequences. Section 7872 distinguishes between gift loans and busi-
ness loans.9 Although defining "below-market loan" in terms of the
statutorily imposed interest rate,' 0 the section simply defines a gift
loan as one where the foregone interest is in the nature of a gift."
Whether the transfer of money pursuant to an interest-free de-
mand loan creates a gift has been the subject of debate.
A. Gift Tax History of Below-Market Loans
Congress enacted section 7872 in part because courts had re-
jected the Service's attempts to tax below-market loans as gifts."
The Service did score an early, but little noted, victory on this is-
sue in Blackburn v. Commissioner.'3 The taxpayer in Blackburn
7. See infra text accompanying notes 107 to 175.
8. I.R.C. § 7872(e)(2) provides:
The term "foregone interest" means, with respect to any period during which
the loan is outstanding, the excess of -
(A) the amount of interest which would have been payable on the loan for the
period if interest accrued on the loan at the applicable Federal rate and were pay-
able annually on the day referred to in subsection (a)(2), over
(B) any interest payable on the loan properly allocable to such period.
See infra text accompanying notes 190 to 214.
9. Subsection (a)(1) states the basic rules for gift loans while subsection (b)(1) states
the basic rule for business loans. Sections II.C. and III. of this article describe the operation
of § 7872(a)(1) in greater detail.
10. I.R.C. § 7872(e)(1) defines this term. See supra note 1. See infra note 37.
11. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(3).
12. Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Crown v. Comm'r, 67
T.C. 1060 (1977), aft'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978); Dickman v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH)
620 (1980).
13. Blackburn v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
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transferred real property to her children in exchange for their
promissory note providing for interest at a rate of 2 / percent per
year with payments extending over 34 /2 years when the prevailing
rate was four percent per year."' The taxpayer conceded that the
difference between the fair market value of the property trans-
ferred and the face amount of the note was a gift, but the Service
asserted a deficiency, claiming that the fair market value of the
note did not equal its face amount.15
The tax court, faced solely with the issue of valuation, agreed
with the Service that the rate of interest and length of maturity
diminished the value of the note and, thus, created a gift equal to
the difference between that value and the value of the property
transferred. 6 When the issue was posed in broader terms to ask if
a below-market loan actually created a gift, however, the federal
district court in Johnson v. United States" relied on these same
two factors to exclude interest-free demand loans from taxation.
The Johnson court rejected the Service's assertion that a se-
ries of such loans from the taxpayers to their children created
gifts.' Despite the decision in Blackburn, the court found no pre-
cedent for the Service's position and indicated that the role of tax-
ing such transactions as gifts belonged to Congress, not the courts.
The court held that the failure to tax such loans as gifts did not
defeat the purpose of the gift tax. The taxpayers' estates were not
diminished, because the notes were assets of the estates. Also, the
14. The four percent rate of interest, used by the tax court as the standard, was the
rate charged on real estate mortgage loans to individuals, secured by commercial real estate
similar to the property securing this promissory note, on the date the taxpayer deeded the
property to her children and in the city where that property was located. Id. at 205.
15. The property transferred had a fair market value of $245,000, and the face amount
of the note was $172,517.65. The taxpayer conceded that the difference between these two
amounts was a gift.
Originally the Commissioner argued that the gift was simply a remainder interest and,
thus, a future interest not entitled to the annual exclusion. In the tax court, the Commis-
sioner abandoned this argument in favor of the claim that the fair market value of the
$172,517.65 promissory note was only $134,538.30. Under this analysis, the taxpayer owed a
deficiency of $23,360.21. Blackburn, 20 T.C. at 204.
16. The tax court stated:
It seems to us that it would be unrealistic for us to hold that a note with a face
value of $172,517.65, bearing interest only at a rate of 2 /4 percent per annum and
having 34 1/2 years to run, had a fair market value on the date of its receipt equal
to its face value. Undoubtedly, petitioner was fully justified in believing that the
note would be paid in full according to its terms, but that factor alone does not
determine the fair market value of a note. Other factors such as the rate of inter-
est which the note bears and the length of maturity must be considered.
Blackburn, 20 T.C. at 204.
17. Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
18. Id. at 77.
[Vol. 47
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taxpayers had no express or statutory duty to charge interest. 9
In 1973, the Service finally issued a revenue ruling in which it
refused to acquiesce in the result of Johnson."° By that time, how-
ever, significant interest-free loans had been made by taxpayers
like the brothers in Crown v. Commissioner21 who used their part-
nership to loan approximately $18,000,000 to separate trusts for
twenty-four relatives. The Service again claimed that the value of
such loans constituted gifts. The tax court rejected this claim and
adopted the rationale of Johnson, noting the administrative
nightmare of exacting a tax upon the interest-free use of money. It
also reasoned that the Service had only recently begun to tax inter-
est free loans as gifts." On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit agreed that such loans permitted income tax
avoidance, but found that reason insufficient to overcome the lack
of precedent, the difficulty of valuation, and the inequity of alter-
ing this aspect of the gift tax without congressional approval.23 The
court meticulously examined two theories propounded by the Ser-
vice: (1) that the transfer of money for a note bearing no interest
and payable on demand was an unequal exchange and, thus, a gift;
(2) alternatively, that the transfer of the right to use money was
itself a gift. It found no support for either theory in the language
or purpose of the gift tax provisions.
Although these courts refused to tax interest-free demand
loans as gifts, the tax court continued to impose a gift tax on low-
interest term loans. In Estate of Berkman v. Commissioner,24 the
taxpayer made a series of term loans, charging interest at a rate
less than prime.25 Having established that the loans were not made
in the ordinary course of business, 6 the court then valued the
19. Id.
20. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
21. Crown v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977).
22. Id. at 1064-65.
23. Crown v. Comm'r, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
24. Estate of Berkman v. Comm'r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979).
25. Berkman made the following loans to his daughter and her husband:
Date Face Amount Interest Charged Prime Rate
11/15/68 $100,000 6% 6.25%
4/24/69 $ 50,000 6% 7.5%
11/19/70 $ 30,000 6% 7.25%
11/19/70 $ 40,000 6% 4.45%
3/2/72 $ 55,000 6% 9.75%
Id. at 184-85.
26. The tax court reached this conclusion because the taxpayer was seventy-five years
old when he made loans extending for twenty years, he received no security for the loans, he
received no payments of principal until maturity, and the borrowers were the natural ob-
jects of his bounty. Id. at 186.
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notes considering the rate of interest, the date of maturity, the
lack of security, and the solvency of the borrowers. It held that the
difference between the amount lent and the fair market value of
the notes constituted a gift. 7
The unequal exchange theory, utilized by the courts in Black-
burn and Berkman to tax low-interest loans as gifts, also applies to
demand loans. The problem in valuing demand notes, as recog-
nized in Crown, arises because the note can be recalled at any mo-
ment and a primary factor in valuation of the note is the term of
the loan.28 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals29 rejected the
proposed solution to this dilemma, which required valuing the gift
at the termination of the loan or the end of the year, whichever
occurred first. The court stated that this solution appeared incon-
sistent with the unequal exchange theory which regarded the gift
as complete on the date of the loan.30 Only when the Service aban-
doned its characterization of interest-free demand loans as unequal
exchanges did it overcome this valuation problem and finally con-
vince a court that such loans did in fact create gifts.31
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Dickman32 per-
ceived the similarity not only between low-interest term loans and
no-interest demand loans, but also between permitting a charitable
organization to use the taxpayer's property rent-free and permit-
ting a borrower to use the taxpayer's money cost-free.33 Holding
27. The tax court distinguished Crown in a footnote by stating that the issue, whether
the difference between the amounts loaned and the fair market value of the notes was a gift,
was not presented to the Crown court and, moreover, the notes in Crown were demand notes
or open accounts, not long-term notes with principal due only at maturity. Id. at 186 n.3.
This attempt to distinguish Crown is hardly persuasive. The precise issue was presented
both in Crown and Berkman. Also, the differences between no-interest demand notes and
low-interest term notes is one of degree, not kind. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90,
92.
28. The fair market value of a note depends on what a willing buyer is willing to pay a
willing seller. Tress. Reg. § 25.2512-1. The longer the buyer must wait for payment, the less
he will pay for the note. See infra text accompanying notes 56 to 58; see also Joyce and
Cotto, Interest-Free Loans: The Odyssey of a Misnomer, 35 TAx L. REv. 459 (1980).
29. Crown v. Comm'r, 585 F.2d 234, 238 (7th Cir. 1978).
30. A gift is -hot taxed until it is complete, that is, when the donor has parted with
control over the property, leaving himself no power to change its disposition either for his
own benefit or for the benefit of another. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b). See infra text accom-
panying notes 108 to 110.
31. Dickman v. Comm'r, 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982).
The tax court in Dickman had disposed of the case in a memorandum opinion simply
citing Crown. Dickman v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 620, 623 (1980).
32. 690 F.2d 812.
33. Low-interest term loans had been taxed as gifts under the unequal exchange the-
ory in Blackburn v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 204 (1953) and Estate of Berkman v. Comm'r, 38
T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979). Taxpayers allowing charitable organizations to use their property
rent-free were allowed charitable deductions for these gifts in a number of cases including
[Vol. 47
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that the tax consequences should also be similar, the court relied
on the language and history of the gift tax to impose a tax on the
value of the right to use money at no cost. The Supreme Court
affirmed,34 emphasizing the language of the statute, legislative his-
tory, its own precedent applying the tax broadly, and the resem-
blance between section 2501 taxing "the transfer of property by
gift" and section 61 taxing income "from whatever source derived."
It found that failure to tax interest-free demand loans permitted
avoidance of both the income and the estate taxes because such
transactions diminished the taxpayers' estates by diverting the
earnings to others." The court recognized that taxpayers could
have consumed, or even wasted, their money. Nevertheless, it held
that a transfer triggered the gift tax as long as taxpayers trans-
ferred the money to others.36
The Court refused to be swayed by visions of an administra-
tive nightmare, relying on the annual exclusion and the split gift
provisions to exclude routine familial and neighborly loans from
the gift tax.3 7 It also gave short shrift to the argument that only
Congress could impose a tax on such transfers.3 8 The Court noted
congressional intent to apply the gift tax broadly so that any exclu-
sion of interest-free demand loans required a specific exemption
and that the Service had consistently maintained an expansive
view of the gift tax." It also held that even if the Service had
changed positions on the taxability of interest-free loans, such
change was permissible and could be applied retroactively. 0
Although the Court in Dickman held that an interest-free de-
mand loan may create a gift, it did not decide either the valuation
issue or the income tax consequences of interest-free demand
loans. To obviate the need for further litigation, Congress incorpo-
rated the taxation of all below-market loans in the Tax Reform Act
Thriftimart, Inc. v. Comm'r, 59 T.C. 598 (1973), Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F.
Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963), and Sullivan v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 228 (1951). See infra text
accompanying notes 97 to 100.
34. Dickman v. Comm'r, 104 S. Ct. 1086, 1090 n.4 (1984).
35. Id. at 1091-92.
36. Id. at 1092.
37. Id. at 1093.
38. Id. at 1093-94.
39. Id. at 1094.
40. Id. The dissent, on the other hand, accepted the taxpayer's vision of an adminis-
trative nightmare arising from taking such transfers. It was also persuaded that doing so
overruled thirty-four years of administrative practice. Finally, the dissent found it anamo-
lous that lenders would be subject to gift tax on these loans, but would not receive a deduc-
tion if the loan was made to a charitable organization. Id. at 1095 (Powell J. dissenting). But
see infra text accompanying notes 177 to 188.
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of 1984 in an attempt to provide consistent tax treatment of nu-
merous situations involving the value of the use of money over
time. Hence, section 7872 covers both the gift tax and the income
tax consequences of all below-market loans.
B. Definition of Gift
Section 7872 does not define gifts; it simply treats as gift loans
all below-market loans where the foregone interest is in the nature
of a gift.4 1 Other sections of the Code also fail to define the concept
of gift even though chapter 12 imposes a tax on all transfers of
property by gift and section 102 excludes gifts from the recipient's
gross income. In fact, courts have developed different tests for gifts
depending on the tax involved. 42
Section 102 excludes from income property received as a result
of detached and disinterested generosity or in the absence of any
moral or legal duty.43 This test requires a case by case determina-
tion of the donor's motive for the transfer 44 and does not resolve
the issue whether or not a below-market loan constitutes a gift.
The gift tax provisions, 45 which abandon this common law concept
of gift in favor of an objective, external standard, contain a more
useful framework for analysis.
Section 2501 imposes a tax on the "transfer of property by
41. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(3). "The proposed regulations provide little clarification of this
definition. Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.7872-4(b)(1) classifies as a gift loan any loan
"in the nature of a gift within the meaning of [the gift tax provisions]." 50 Fed. Reg. at
33560. The Conference Committee Report does provide more guidance by stating:
A gift loan is any below-market loan where the foregone interest is in the
nature of a gift. In general, there is a gift if property (including foregone interest)
is transferred for less than full and adequate consideration under circumstances
where the transfer is a gift for gift tax purposes. A sale, exchange, or other trans-
fer made in the ordinary course of business (i.e., a transaction which is bona fide,
at arms length and free from any donative intent) generally is considered as made
for and [sic] full and adequate consideration. A loan between unrelated persons
can qualify as a gift loan.
H.R. REP. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1018, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
1445, 1706.
This definition, however, applies for purposes of the income tax, not the gift tax. See
infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. Although few cases will depend on which defini-
tion is applied, the gift tax definition is preferable.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); Hamberg v. Comm'r, 400 F.2d
435 (9th Cir. 1968); Lockard v. Comm'r, 166 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1948); Farid Es-Sultaneh v.
Comm'r, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947); Dunn v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Pa.
1949).
43. I.R.C. § 102(a); see also Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Helvering v.
American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943); Bogardus v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
44. Id.
45. I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524.
[Vol. 47
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gift." A below-market loan is a transfer, but whether the interest
transferred constitutes property is not as clear. Property includes
more than the physical object; it encompasses all the rights pro-
tected by law, including the right to possess property, to exclude
others from possession, to use it, and ultimately to dispose of it.46
The committee reports accompanying the enactment of the gift tax
clearly state that the term "property" includes every interest pro-
tected by law that has exchangeable value. 7
Characterizing the nature of the transfer occurring in a below-
market loan determines the nature of the interest transferred.
Under the unequal exchange theorya the property transferred is
the principal amount of the loan. Although some sections of the
Code exclude money from the definition of property,4 9 section 2501
is not among them. The committee reports5 ° and the regulations51
specifically define a transfer of money as a gift.
The unequal exchange theory easily encompasses term loans,
because the difference between the principal and the value of the
note can be quantified.52 When the note is payable on demand,
however, the value of the note cannot be ascertained on the date of
the transfer because the length of the loan is uncertain. Recogniz-
ing this, the Service alternatively characterized a demand loan as
an outright transfer of the right to use the lender's money rather
than an unequal exchange of that money for a note.53
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Crown54 refused to
46. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Chicago & W. Ind. R.R. v. En-
glewood Connecting Ry., 115 Ill. 375, 4 N.E. 246 (1886); Tod v. Wick Bros. & Co., 36 Ohio
St. 370 (1881); see also 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 138 (1765), 2 J. Kent, Commenta-
ries 320 (14th ed. 1896).
47. H.R. REP. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27; S. REP. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39.
48. The unequal exchange theory, rejected by the Seventh Circuit in Crown v.
Comm'r, 585 F.2d 234, is based on I.R.C. § 2512 which provides: "Where property is trans-
ferred for less than adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, then the
amount by which the value of the property exceed[s the value of the consideration shall be
deemed a gift ...."
See cases cited infra note 92 and accompanying text.
49. I.R.C. §§ 48, 83, 168, 1231, 1245, 1250.
50. See supra note 47.
51. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a).
52. The unequal exchange theory compares the value of the property transferred-the
amount loaned-to the consideration received-the fair market value of the note. The fair
market value of a term note is the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller when
neither is under any compulsion and when both have reasonable knowledge of all the facts.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1. The primary factors a buyer will consider in determining this price
are the interest rate and the length of maturity. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 204
(1953); Estate of Berkman v. Comm'r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979); see also Joyce and
Cotto, supra note 32.
53. Crown v. Comm'r, 585 F.2d 234; Dickman v. Comm'r, 690 F.2d 812.
54. 585 F.2d 234.
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impose the gift tax even pursuant to this alternative characteriza-
tion. It analogized the demand loan to a tenancy at will, but found
that such tenancy, although protected at law against third persons,
provided no protection against the lender.55 In Dickman, the Court
dismissed this concern, reasoning that a tenancy at will had long
been recognized as a protectable property right. It separated valua-
tion of such right from the existence of the right:5"
The right to the use of $100,000 without charge is a valuable
interest in the money lent, as much so as the rent-free use of
property consisting of land and buildings. In either case, there is
a measurable economic value associated with the use of the prop-
erty transferred. The value of the use of money is found in what
it can produce; the measure of that value is interest-"rent" for
the use of the funds. We can assume that an interest free loan for
a fixed period, especially for a prolonged period, may have greater
value than such a loan made payable on demand, but it would
defy common human experience to say that an intrafamily loan
payable on demand is not subject to accommodation; its value
may be reduced by virtue of its demand status, but that value is
surely not eliminated.5 7
A property right exists despite the lack of protection against
the lender. The ability to use property-whether merely to possess
it or to use it to produce income-is an essential property inter-
est. 8 The lender, as owner of the property, may circumscribe the
right to use it by requiring it to be used only in certain ways or
only for a specific time. That the lender retains the right to de-
mand repayment at any time does not destroy the existence of the
property interest; it simply affects valuation of that right."9
The problem in valuing demand loans arises from the belief
that the lender will (not simply might) demand repayment imme-
diately. This assumption ignores reality. Demand loans are usually
made for specific reasons, and they will probably be outstanding
for a substantial period of time. In three cases, lenders left the
loans outstanding for periods extending over a number of years.60
55. Id.
56. Dickman v. Comm'r, 104 S. Ct. 1086.
57. Id. at 1091.
58. See cases cited supra note 46.
59. See, e.g., Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943); Lockard v. Comm'r, 166 F.2d
409 (1st Cir. 1948); United States v. Frank, 133 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1943); Comm'r v. Mc-
Lean, 127 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1942); Hughes v. Comm'r, 104 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1939).
60. In Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), the taxpayers had
made many interest-free demand loans to their children from prior to 1956 through 1962,
the final year in issue. Although the children repaid some of the loans in full or in part, the
taxpayers continued to make new loans. The economic effect was identical to leaving the
[Vol. 47
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The value of the right transferred may be minuscule in a few hypo-
thetical situations, but this does not justify refusal to tax transfers
of significant amounts of money over extended periods of time. 1
The valuation problem remains, however, because a critical
factor-the length of the loan-remains uncertain until the termi-
nation of the loan. Difficulty in valuation does not, however, de-
stroy the existence of the property right.62 It simply mandates an
alternative method of evaluation.
Allowing the lender to escape the gift tax on the transfer of
the right to use money without paying interest ignores the statu-
tory language, legislative intent, precedent, and administrative
practice. Section 2511 indicates that the tax applies "whether the
transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indi-
rect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or in-
tangible." Section 2512(b) provides that
Where property is transferred for less than adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which
the value of the property exceed[s] the value of the consideration
shall be deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing the
amount of gifts made during the calendar year.
The committee reports state:
[T]he terms "property," "transfer," "gift," and "indirectly" are
used in the broadest and most comprehensive sense; the term
"property" reaching every species of right or interest protected by
loans outstanding over the years.
In Crown v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 1060, aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), the court's state-
ment of the facts does not indicate how long the loans had been outstanding to thirteen of
the trusts. Nonetheless, neither these loans nor the loans made on January 3, 1967, were
repaid during 1967.
In Dickman v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 620 (1980), the taxpayers made a series of no-
interest demand loans between 1971 and 1976 to their son and his corporation. Although the
corporation repaid its loans in part, there was a significant balance outstanding at the time
of litigation. The son apparently either did not repay his loans or received new loans.
61. In Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), total loans out-
standing at the end of the year to each of the taxpayer's children ranged from $101,740.88 to
$299,672.68, while the amounts loaned to their son-in-law were significantly lower, ranging
from $217.53 to $15,662.44.
In Crown v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 1060, aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), the total loans
outstanding to thirteen trusts on January 1, 1967, were $2,262,574. On January 3, 1967, the
company made additional loans to all twenty-four trusts totalling $15,960,000. The tax-
payer's share of these loans was one-third.
In Dickman v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 620 (1980), the outstanding balance to the
son ranged from $144,715.87 to $342,915.87, while the outstanding balance to the corpora-
tion ranged from $207,875.00 to $699,733.00.
62. See, e.g., Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943); Robinette v. Helvering, 318
U.S. 184 (1943); Gait v. Comm'r, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954); Lockard v. Comm'r, 166 F.2d
409 (1st Cir. 1948).
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law and having exchangeable value.
The words "transfer ... by gift" and "whether ... direct or indi-
rect" are designed to cover and comprehend all transactions ...
whereby and to the extent.., that property or a property right is
donatively passed to or conferred upon another, regardless of the
means or the device employed in its accomplishment.6 3
This reflects congressional intent to reach every possible arrange-
ment that gratuitously transfers economic benefits. The Treasury,
following this mandate, issued regulations encompassing a broad
range of transactions.
The tax is not limited in its imposition to transfers of property
without consideration, which in common law are termed gifts, but
extends to sales and exchanges for less than an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth .... Thus, for example,
a taxable transfer may be effected by the declaration of a trust,
the forgiving of a debt, the assignment of a judgment, the assign-
ment of the benefits of a contract of insurance, or the transfer of
cash, certificates of deposit, or federal, state or municipal bonds.
Inasmuch as the tax also applies to gifts indirectly made, all
transactions whereby property or property rights or interests are
donatively passed or conferred upon another, regardless of the
means of device employed, constitute gifts subject to tax.6 4
Neither the Code, the committee reports, nor the regulations
define the concept of gift. They purposefully left the concept vague
to adapt to changing conditions and taxpayers' attempts to avoid
the tax. Determining the existence of a gift thus becomes a case by
case endeavor.
Courts have relied on the breadth of the statutory language,
the committee reports, and the regulations to tax a broad range of
transactions as gifts: outright grants of property; 5 establishment of
trusts" or joint interests in property; 7 the payment of another's
expenses; 8 allowing the statute of limitations to run on a debt; 9
63. H.R. Rep. 708, 72d Cong., lst Sess. 27; S. Rep. 665, 72d Cong., lst Sess. 39.
64. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1.
65. See, e.g., Haines v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 1012 (1938) (insurance policies); Hammer-
sly v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 768 (Ct. Cl. 1936) (United States bond); Phipps v. Comm'r,
34 B.T.A. 641 (1936) (United States bond); Fish v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 1002 (1933) (real
estate).
66. See, e.g., Welch v. Paine, 130 F.2d 990 (1st Cir. 1941); Comm'r v. Montague, 126
F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1942); Welch v. Davidson, 102 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1939); Rheinstrom v.
Comm'r, 105 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1939); Hughes v. Comm'r, 104 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1939).
67. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Hart, 106 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1939); Lilly v. Smith, 96 F.2d 341
(7th Cir. 1938).
68. Drybrough v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
69. Estate of Lang v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 404 (1975), aff'd, 613 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980).
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the donation of political contributions; 70 forgiveness of debt;71 as-
signment of lease proceeds;72 creation of a corporation with stock
distributions not accurately reflecting contributions to capital;73
disclaimers;74 antenuptial agreements;7 5 and the transfer of prop-
erty in exchange for an annuity.7 6 In reaching these decisions,
courts recognized that Congress intended to tax not only those
transfers considered gifts in the colloquial sense, but also any ex-
change where the value of the property transferred exceeded the
consideration received.
To avoid taxing bargain sales or exchanges, the regulations ex-
clude transfers made in the ordinary course of business.77 For a
transaction to qualify for this exception, the transfer must be bona
fide, at arms' length, and free of donative intent.78 Thus, although
Congress disavowed donative intent as the hallmark of a gift for
purposes of the gift tax, 9 such intent removes transfers from the
ordinary course of business exception and becomes a prime indica-
tion of the existence of a gift.
Determining if a below-market loan falls within this exception
to the gift tax requires an examination of not only all facts and
circumstances, but also the intent of the parties.80 Loans from em-
70. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974). But see Car-
son v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981); Stern v. United States, 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir.
1971).
71. See, e.g., Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La.
1975).
72. See, e.g., Gait v. Comm'r, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954).
73. See, e.g., Heringer v. Comm'r, 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927
(1956).
74. See, e.g., Haidenbugh v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836
(1952).
75. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308
(1945).
76. See, e.g., Lazarus v. Comm'r, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975); Continental Ill. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 29 B.T.A. 945 (1934).
77. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 45; see also Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Rev. Rul. 80-
196, 1980-2 C.B. 32.
80. The factors that courts have emphasized in determining that transfers are made in
the ordinary course of business include that the transferee is other than a natural object of
the transferor's bounty, that the transfer occurred after substantial and prolonged negotia-
tion, and that there are substantial business reasons for the transfer, for example, to retain
employees or provide them with an incentive. See, e.g., Carson v. Comm'r, aff'd, 71 T.C. 252
(1981), 641 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981); Stein v. United States, 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971);
Estate of Berkman v. Comm'r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979); Weller v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 790
(1961); Lampert v. Comm'r, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 1184 (1956); Bryan v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 972
(1951); Beveridge v. Comm'r, 10 T.C. 915 (1948); Estate of Anderson v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 706
(1947).
The proposed regulations provide some guidance in distinguishing gift loans from com-
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ployers to employees and from corporations to shareholders will
most often avoid the gift tax, because they are made at arm's
length to compensate the employee for services or to permit the
shareholder to share in the corporation's profits without the decla-
ration of a dividend."1 The detached and disinterested generosity
necessary for donative intent is absent in such circumstances, but
family transfers raise the presumption of donative intent on belief
that love and affection rather than economics motivate the lend-
ers.8 Below-market loans are, by definition, made for inadequate
consideration."' Only when they result from real negotiation and
the lender receives consideration other than love and affection will
below-market family loans escape the gift tax.
Precedent and the policies underlying the gift tax mandate
taxing below-market loans as gifts. The gift tax was designed pri-
marily to prevent avoidance of income and estate taxes.84 Un-
pensation-related or corporation-shareholder loans. Although in general loans are to be
characterized by the substance of the transaction, the proposed regulations presume that
loans to (1) an employee of a publicly held corporation who, directly or indirectly, owns
more than 0.5 percent of the total voting power or the total value of all nonvoting stock or
the total value of all stock, or (2) an employee of a non-publicly held corporation who owns
more than five percent of the total voting power or the total value of all nonvoting stock or
the total value of all stock are corporation-shareholder loans. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-
4(d)(2). The proposed regulations also state that if more than twenty-five percent of the
value of the loan is attributable to the performance of services, the loan will be classified as
a compensation-related loan. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(c)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33560-61.
81. See, e.g., Weller v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 790 (1961); Bryan v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 972
(1951); Estate of Anderson v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 706 (1947); Rev. Rul. 80-196, 1980-2 C.B. 32.
82. See, e.g., Estate of Berkman v. Comm'r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979); Heringer v.
Comm'r, 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1956).
The proposed regulations define the concept of loan broadly to include any extension of
credit or any transaction where the owner permits another to use his money for any period
of time. The economic substance of the transaction governs, not the taxpayer's characteriza-
tion. The purpose is to implement the legislative intent to curb tax avoidance schemes.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(6)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33557.
Moreover, the proposed regulations sweep within their coverage of below-market loans
both indirect loans and an integrated series of transactions which amount to a loan. §
1.7872-2(a) specifically provides that the steps of a series of transactions will be collapsed, if
necessary, to tax the economic substance of the entire transaction. § 1.7872-4(g) likewise
provides that indirect loans will be restructured as two or more loans. Each loan will be
subject to § 7872.
83. See supra note 1.
84. A separate gift tax was not seriously considered by Congress until 1924. Prior to
that time the only issue was whether or not to include gifts as taxable income. Compare The
Revenue Act of 1894, PUB. L. No. 227, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, including gifts, with The Revenue
Act of 1913, PUB. L. No. 16, § IIB, 38 Stat. 114, excluding them. When Congress enacted an
estate tax in 1916, some legislators expressed concern about taxpayer attempts to avoid the
estate tax through inter-vivos gifts. The Revenue Act of 1916, PUB. L. No. 271, § 4, 39 Stat.
756; 53 Cong. Rec. 11, 107-9 (1916); see generally Harris, Legislative History of Federal Gift
Taxation, 18 Taxes 531 (1940). This concern produced a provision taxing gifts made within
two years of death as testamentary transfers.
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doubtedly below-market loans permit lenders to avoid income
taxes."5 The income generated by the principal is taxed to the bor-
rower rather than the lender,8 6 thereby circumventing the assign-
ment of income doctrine which requires that the owner of the
property be taxed on the income generated from that property.8 7
Moreover, below-market loans permit avoidance of estate tax be-
cause they diminish the lender's estate by diverting income to the
borrower that would otherwise accumulate in the lender's estate.88
Alternatively, all unequal exchanges diminish the lender's estate,
since the lender receives less than he gives. For example, assume
that A loans B $100 for one year and charges no interest when the
prevailing rate of interest is ten percent. The fair market value of
B's note is based on the interest rate charged, the term of the note,
the security given, and B's financial stability. Even assuming that
B gave adequate security and is financially responsible with ade-
quate resources to repay the loan, the fair market value of the note
is still $91. If A had died the day after the loan, A's estate would
contain $91 rather than $100.9
A 1921 attempt to tax gifts outright failed. See Harris, 18 Taxes at 533. A true gift tax
was finally enacted in 1924 as the result of a battle over income tax rates. The Revenue Act
of 1924, PUB. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 313. Proponents of the 1924 gift tax feared that wealthy
taxpayers would make gifts to lower their income and, thus, avoid the higher rates. 65 Cong.
Rec. 3120, 3172-93 (1924); see generally Magill, The Federal Gift Tax, 40 COL. L. REV. 773
(1940). When Congress discovered a revenue surplus in 1926, it repealed the gift tax. The
Revenue Act of 1926, PuB. L. No. 69-70, 44 Stat. 175.
But when the Supreme Court in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), held that the
estate tax provision taxing transfers within two years of death violated due process by creat-
ing an irrebutable presumption, Congress quickly reenacted the gift tax. The Revenue Act
of 1932, PUB. L. No. 72-154, § 501, 47 Stat. 245. This history demonstrates the dual purpose
of the gift tax-to prevent avoidance of the income tax and the estate tax.
85. Even though refusing to tax interest-free demand loans as gifts, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals conceded that such loans permitted avoidance of income tax. Crown v.
Comm'r, 585 F.2d 234 (1978); see also Dickman v. Comm'r, 104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984).
86. I.R.C. § 102(b) provides that the income produced by a gift, as well as a gift of
income, is taxed as the recipient's income rather than the donor's. Although the question of
whether the income earned as a result of a below-market loan is to be taxed to the lender or
the borrower has not been litigated, the borrower would appear to be the taxpayer pursuant
to I.R.C. § 102(b).
87. See, e.g., Lusthaus v. Comm'r, 327 U.S. 293 (1946); Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280
(1946); Comm'r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944); Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941);
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Lucas v.
Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
88. See, e.g., Jewett v. Comm'r, 455 U.S. 305 (1982); Harris v. Comm'r, 340 U.S. 106
(1950); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943);
Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); Bristol v. Comm'r, 121 F.2d 129 (1st Cir.
1941).
In Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), and in Crown v.
Comm'r, 67 T.C. 1060, aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), the courts rejected this reasoning.
89. See Joyce and Cotto, supra note 28.
15
Willbanks: Interest-free Loans Are No Longer Free: Tax Consequences of Gift Loans
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
This same analysis applies to demand loans. The value of a
demand note is not necessarily equal to its face amount. First, the
lender most likely does not intend to demand repayment instantly.
Second, little or no interest is charged. Third, any factor which in-
fluences the ability of the lender to collect affects valuation includ-
ing the security given for the loan, the liquidity of the investment
made with the loan proceeds, and the financial responsibility of the
borrowers. Finally, below-market demand loans, especially between
family members, remain outstanding for significant periods of
time.90 Although these factors are not readily quantifiable, they do
diminish the value of the demand note and, thus, the lender's
estate.
The courts' failure to accept this reasoning stemmed from the
belief that taxpayers have no duty to charge interest and that fail-
ure to charge interest was analogous to consuming the money."
This rationale permitted wealthy taxpayers to avoid tax by loaning
money rather than making outright gifts. Assuming a ten percent
return on investments, a taxpayer could give his child $1,000 by
loaning the child $10,000 interest-free. This transaction differs
from the taxpayer's purchase of a commodity for his own con-
sumption since the child rather than the taxpayer receives the ben-
efit. When the taxpayer is motivated by affection for his child
rather than business reasons, the loan becomes the essence of a
gift: a voluntary transfer for inadequate consideration conferring
economic benefit on the recipient.
In the past, failure to tax interest-free demand loans also cre-
ated inconsistency with existing case law. Three distinct lines of
cases supported imposing tax on interest-free demand loans. The
first line of cases held that unequal exchanges, including low-inter-
est term loans, constituted gifts.9 2 This theory applies equally to
90. See supra note 60.
91. Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Crown v. Comm'r, 67
T.C. 1060, aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978); Dickman v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 620
(1980).
Congress rejected this analysis in § 7872. Instead, it emphasized the economic substance
of the transactions and the possibility of tax avoidance. H.R. REP. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
1373, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 323.
92. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 204 (1953) (transfer of real property in
exchange for a promissory note bearing interest at a below-market rate); Meyers v. Comr'r,
27 T.C.M. (CCH) 975 (1968) (transfer of remainder interest in real property for annuity);
Estate of Bartman v. Comm'r, 10 T.C. 1073 (1948) (transfer of real property for annuity);
Hunkele v. Comm'r, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 426 (1944) (transfer of one-half interest in property
valued at $130,000 for an interest-free promissory note with a face amount of $95,020.07);
Estate of Bergan v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 543 (1943) (transfer of property for promise to support
for life); see also Estate of Berkman v. Comm'r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979) (transfer of
money for low-interest promissory notes).
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demand loans. In most demand-loan situations, the rate of interest
charged and the time to actual demand for repayment, the uncer-
tainty of collection due to the liquidity of the investment, the se-
curity provided for the note, and the financial responsibility of the
borrowers diminish the value of the note. Quantifying this value
presents difficulty, but does not justify allowing demand loans to
escape taxation. The difference between term and demand loans is
simply one of degree, not kind.
In the second line of cases, courts held that the right to use
another's property without paying rent conferred an economic ben-
efit on the recipient. The courts reasoned that such benefit relieved
the recipient of an expense he would otherwise incur.9 3 This eco-
nomic benefit was considered income because of the broad reach of
section 61.1 These cases support the conclusion that permitting
one to use property without cost also confers a sufficient economic
benefit on the recipient to impose the gift tax. It makes no differ-
ence if the property transferred is a house, a boat, or money.
The refusal of courts to tax as income the benefit flowing from
below-market loans does not undercut this analysis.9 5 This refusal
is based on the deduction allowed for interest payments rather
than the lack of economic benefit. Courts reasoned that if income
were imputed to the borrower of a below-market loan, a corre-
sponding deduction would have to be imputed for interest paid
which would cancel the imputation of income. 6
The third line of cases permitted charitable deductions for
transferring the right to use the taxpayer's property without pay-
ing rent to a charitable organization.97 In Passailaigue v. United
States,98 the court rejected the claim that allowing an organization
to use property rent-free was not a gift of property but merely the
granting of a privilege, stating:
"Property" is more than just the physical thing-the land, the
93. See, e.g., Dean v. Comm'r, 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951) (aff'g 9 T.C. 256 (1947));
Chandler v. Comm'r, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941); Richards v. Comm'r, 111 F.2d 376 (5th
Cir. 1940); Hillman v. Comm'r, 71 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1934); Heyward v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 739
(1961); Reynard Corp. v. Comm'r, 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934); Frueauff v. Comm'r, 30 B.T.A. 449
(1934); see also Peacock v. Comm'r, 256 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1958) (below-market rent).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Baker v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 166 (1980), aff'd, 677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1982);
Greenspun v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 931 (1979), aff'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Dean v.
Comm'r, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975); Passailaigue v.
United States, 224 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963); Allen v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 12 (1971); Sulli-
van v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
98. 224 F. Supp. 682.
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bricks, the mortar-it is also the sum of all the rights and powers
incident to ownership of the physical thing. It is the tangible and
the intangible. Property is composed of constituent elements and
of these elements the right to use the physical thing to the exclu-
sion of others is the most essential and beneficial. Without this
right all other elements would be of little value, for if the owner is
deprived of the use of the tangible thing, little more than a bar-
ren title is left in his hands.99
Other courts also held that such transfers conferred a valuable
benefit on the organization sufficient to merit a charitable deduc-
tion. 00 They had no difficulty valuing the deduction even though
the taxpayers retained the right to repossess the property at any
time. These cases are directly analogous to the cases involving the
taxation of interest-free demand loans as gifts. In both cases, there
is a transfer of a valuable property right: the right to use property.
Moreover, the courts' failure to tax the economic substance of
interest-free loans permitted some taxpayers to circumvent the as-
signment of income doctrine. The assignment of income doctrine
requires the actual owner of property to report as taxable income
any income generated by that property."'0 Taxpayers lending sums
interest-free, however, were not required to report any income
earned by the loan proceeds; rather, the borrower was taxed on
such income.102
In addition to these cases, interest-free demand loans resem-
ble a variety of other situations that produce gift tax consequences.
For example, assume that B borrows $100,000 when the interest
rate is ten percent. If B borrows from a bank and A pays B's inter-
est obligation, A makes a gift to B of $10,000, the amount of the
interest.103 The same result occurs if A pays B the $10,000 to use to
pay the interest.104 Moreover, if B borrows from A and A forgives
the interest, A again makes a gift to B of $10,000.06 Finally, if A
transferred $100,000 to a revocable trust to pay the income to B,
each payment of income would be a gift from A to B. 06 If A loans
99. Id. at 686.
100. See cases cited supra note 97.
101. See cases cited supra note 87. Congress was particularly concerned about this
possibility. See supra note 85.
102. This issue, however, does not appear to have been litigated.
103. See, e.g., Drybrough v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Rev.
Rul. 54-343, 1954-2 C.B. 318.
104. See, e.g., Steele v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 589 (1938); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1.
105. See, e.g., Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La.
1975); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a).
106. See, e.g., Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1930); Roeser v. Comm'r, 2 T.C.
298 (1943); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b).
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B $100,000 without charging interest, the same economic situation
exists and the same tax consequences should occur. There is,
therefore, no reasoned justification for excluding any form of be-
low-market loan from gift tax consequences.
The need for consistency within the federal tax system man-
dates similar treatment for these similar situations. The tax system
operates on the principle of voluntary compliance. Without it, the
system would collapse. The perception that some taxpayers avoid
paying tax because of arrangements such as interest-free demand
loans undermines such compliance and, thus, threatens the contin-
ued viability of the tax system. Additionally, the principle of equal
treatment is firmly embedded in all aspects of the legal system.
Different tax consequences should occur from different arrange-
ments only when those arrangements cause different economic re-
sults. Below-market demand loans produce the same economic out-
come as revocable trusts and the payment or forgiveness of interest
and should, therefore, trigger the same tax treatment.
C. Tax Consequences of Gift Loans
Section 7872 does not impose any tax on below-market gift
loans. Rather, it merely provides that any foregone interest is
treated as transferred from the lender to the borrower and then
retransferred from the borrower to the lender on the last day of
the year.107 This means that the lender is considered to have made
a gift to the borrower equal to the amount of the foregone interest
and that the borrower must report this amount as income unless it
is excluded by section 104. Further, the lender is treated as receiv-
ing interest income equal to the amount of the foregone interest,
and the borrower is entitled to an interest deduction of the same
amount.
1. Gift Tax
The gift tax is imposed on the donor based on the value of the
property transferred at the time when the donor releases dominion
and control over the property, leaving himself no power to alter its
disposition. 08 Even prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984 this prin-
In addition, A would be taxed on the income earned by the trust pursuant to the gran-
tor trust rules. I.R.C. § 676. Congress was particularly concerned with the ability of lenders
of interest-free loans to avoid this rule. See supra note 85.
107. I.R.C. § 7872 (a)(1). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-6, 50 Fed. Reg. at 33562.
This proposed regulation provides special rules for the timing of the imputed transfer in the
case of the borrower's death or repayment of the loan.
108. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b).
19861
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ciple presented no problem for the taxation of term loans as the
lender lost control of the money on the date the loan was made.
Courts considered the gift complete and taxed it accordingly.109
Section 7872 codifies this. It treats the lender as making an addi-
tional transfer to the borrower at the time the loan is made of an
amount equal to the difference between the amount received by
the borrower and the present value of all payments required to be
made pursuant to the loan terms.110
Demand loans, on the other hand, do not fit into the same
pattern. The gift cannot be complete at the time the note is exe-
cuted because the lender retains the right to reclaim the prop-
erty-the money-at any time. Pursuant to this analysis the gift is
never completed and, thus, escapes taxation. Section 7872 solves
this dilemma by treating demand loans, not as the transfer of
money, but as the transfer of the right to use money. This transfer
occurs on the last day of the calendar year, if there is any foregone
interest attributable to any period during that calendar year,
rather than at the time the loan is made.1 The gift tax is imposed
on this second transfer each year that the loan remains
outstanding.
Because of this, demand loans provide a tax savings over term
loans. If A lends B $500,000 interest-free when the applicable stat-
utory rate is ten percent per year and makes the loan a term loan
for five years with no payments due until maturity, the present
value of the payments is $306,956.68,112 and the amount of the gift
is $193,043.32, the difference between the amount received and the
present value of the payments.1 On the other hand, if the loan is
a demand loan and A does not demand repayment for five years, A
is treated as making five gifts of $50,000 each.1 4 The present value
of these gifts is $189,539.34,115 but A may exclude $50,000 from his
109. See Blackburn v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 204 (1953); Estate of Berkman v. Comm'r, 38
T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979).
110. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1), (e)(1)(B), (e)(2). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-7(a), 50
Fed. Reg. at 33563.
111. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(2). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-6, supra note 103.
112. The present value is derived from the use of the formula: P = (n)/(1 + i)t where
P is the present value of $500,000 (n) to be received five years (t) from the present and
where the interest rate (i) is ten percent compounded semi-annually (see infra note 103),
which equals interest at a rate of 10 1/ percent per year.
P = $500,000/(1.1025)5 = $500,000/1.6288943 = $306,956.68
113. $500,000 - $306,956.68 = $193,043.32
114. See I.R.C. § 7872(a)(2) which states that "any foregone interest attributable to
periods during any calendar year shall be treated as transferred ... on the last day of such
calendar year.
115. The present value of receiving $50,000 in each year is calculated according to the
formula in Note 112 supra. For the first year n is $50,000, i is ten percent and t is one year,
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taxable gifts under section 2503(b). 111 This exclusion applies annu-
ally so that A excludes only $10,000 for the term loan, but $50,000
for the demand loan.
Few taxpayers, however, will pay gift tax as a result of below-
market loans. Section 7872 does not apply to any day on which the
loans between two individuals do not aggregate more than
$10,000.11 All loans between the individuals are included regard-
less of the rate of interest charged."' 8 Thus, if A has made a loan of
$5,000 to B at the statutory rate, and then made an additional loan
of $10,000 at no interest, the de minimis exception will not exclude
the below-market loan from taxation. If the $5,000 had been repaid
prior to the second loan, then the de minimis exception would ap-
ply and neither A nor B would suffer any tax consequences." 9
In applying the de minimis exception, a husband and a wife
are treated as one individual whether they are lenders or borrow-
ers.12 0 This reflects the economic reality of most below-market
loans and prevents the doubling of the benefits of the de minimis
exception through the split gift provisions121 simply because the
lender is married. Although the split gift provision recognizes that
spouses can achieve the same result through a gift from the hus-
band to the wife, followed by transfers from both of them to a
third party because of the unlimited marital deduction, doubling
thus, P = ($50,000)/(1.1)' = ($50,000)/(1.1) = $45,454.55.
For the second year, n is $50,000, i is ten percent and t is two. Thus, P = ($50,000)/
(1.1)2 = ($50,000)/(1.21) = $41,322.31.
For the third year, n is $50,000, i is ten percent and t is three. Thus, P = ($50,000)/
(1.1)3 = $50,000/(1.331) = $37,565.74.
For the fourth year, n is $50,000, i is ten percent and t is four. Thus, P ($50,000)/
(1.1)4 = ($50,000)/(1.4641) = $34,150.67.
For the fifth year, n is $50,000, i is ten percent and t is five. Thus, P = ($50,000)/(1.1)'
= ($50,000)/(1.61051) = $31,046.07. The sum of these five gifts is $189,539.34.
116. I.R.C. § 2503(b) provides:
In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property) made to
any person by the donor during the calendar year, the first $10,000 of such gifts to
such person shall not ... be included in the total amount of [taxable] gifts made
during such year.
117. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8, 50 Fed. Reg. at 33564.
Only loans between natural persons escape § 7872 treatment. Id.
118. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33564.
119. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1-7872-8(b)(5), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33564.
120. I.R.C. § 7872(0(7). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(c), 50 Fed. Reg. at
33566.
121. I.R.C. § 2513(a) provides:
A gift made by one spouse to any person other than his spouse shall, for the
purposes of this chapter, be considered as made one-half by him and one-half by
his spouse ....
This provision, coupled with I.R.C. § 2503(b), permits the taxpayer to transfer $20,000
per year without incurring gift tax liability. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
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the benefit of the de minimis exception creates too large an ex-
emption from the gift tax.
In fact, the de minimis exception itself is unnecessary. The
annual exclusion '22 was designed to allow taxpayers to make birth-
day and holiday gifts without keeping an accounting.2 3 This exclu-
sion precludes taxing the loan of $1,000 to a child upon graduation
from college, the loan of $10 from one colleague to another until
payday, the loan of a lawnmower to a neighbor, the provision of a
night's lodging to guests, the rent-free use of a home to a child
over eighteen, and the brief loan of a car.' 24 Significant amounts
must be loaned before the gift exceeds the annual exclusion. Only
if the amount of foregone interest resulting from such loans ex-
ceeds the value of $10,000125 per year, when added to all other gra-
tuitous transfers to that individual, will the tax collector come
knocking on the lender's door. Even then, the unified credit re-
lieves most taxpayers of actually paying the gift tax. 26 Because the
annual exclusion already excludes most familial and neighborly
loans, the de minimis exception simply permits taxpayers wealthy
enough to transfer property by way of loans, rather than outright,
to double the benefit of the annual exclusion.127
Nonetheless, this exception reflects a choice to target tax
avoidance schemes rather than small intrafamily transfers, thereby
permitting parents to assist their children in purchasing a car or a
home where the purpose of the loan is not to shift income to lower
bracket taxpayers. 2 8 Moreover, section 7872 does not apply to
122. Id.
123. H.R. REP. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1939); S. REP. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39
(1939).
124. These examples were mentioned by the court in Crown v. Comm'r, 585 F.2d 234,
241 (7th Cir. 1978), and the dissent in Dickman v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1086, 1097
(1984), as reasons not to impose gift tax on interest-free demand loans.
125. The current interest rate for demand loans is ten percent. PuB. L. No. 98-369, §
172(c)(4). Thus, the lender can lend the borrower $100,000 interest-free payable on demand
and still incur no gift tax. This assumes that there are no other gifts from the lender to the
borrower during the tax year.
126. I.R.C. § 2505 provides a credit against the gift tax of $96,300, which is equivalent
to gifts totalling $325,000. In 1985 the credit will be $121,800 (corresponding to gifts total-
ling $400,000), in 1986 the credit will be $155,800 (corresponding to gifts totalling $500,000)
and in 1987 the credit will be $192,800 (corresponding to gifts totalling $600,000). I.R.C. §
2505(b).
127. Wealthy taxpayers are more likely to make interest-free loans than poorer tax-
payers. Assuming an interest rate of ten percent, a taxpayer must loan $100,000 to create a
benefit of $10,000. Poorer taxpayers who want to create the same benefit must give the
money outright.
128. Although Congress wanted to close the interest free loophole and tax transactions
according to their economic reality, it did not want to foreclose arrangements between fam-
ily members to finance the purchase of consumption items such as higher education, homes,
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cases included in section 483.129 Thus, parents may continue to sell
property to their children on the installment basis, charging less
than market interest rates.3 0
On the other hand, when the purpose of the below-market
loan is to purchase or carry income-producing assets, the de
minimis exception will not apply.'3 ' In enacting this provision,
Congress recognized that such loans allowed lenders to shift in-
come to lower bracket taxpayers without losing ultimate control
over the property.'3 2 Because courts refused to impose either a gift
or an income tax on such loans,' 3 below-market loans were pre-
ferred to assigning income, a short-term trust, a revocable trust or
the payment or forgiveness of the borrower's interest obligation. In
all these situations, the owner of the property paid both income
tax on the income produced by the property and gift tax on the
value of the gift of income to the recipient.134
cars and the like since such arrangements do not result in the shifting of income from one
family member to another. See H.R. REP. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1375, reprinted in 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3328. Congressional intent is evident in the de minimis excep-
tion of § 7872(c)(2), particularly the exception to this exception for income producing assets
financed by interest-free loans. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
129. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(8).
130. I.R.C. § 483(g). The Tax Reform Act of 1984 amended § 483, but retained this
exception. PUB. L. No. 98-369, § 41(b) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 483(f)).
131. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2)(B).
132. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
133. See cases cited supra note 12.
134. When the owner of property attempts to transfer only the income from that
property and not all his interest in the property, courts have held that the owner of the
property, rather than the recipient of the income, will owe income tax on the amount of
income generated. See cases cited supra note 87. The transfer will also be considered a gift
pursuant to I.R.C. § 2511. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a); see also Galt v. Comm'r, 216 F.2d
41 (7th Cir. 1954).
A short-term irrevocable trust, as used in this article, means a trust in which the gran-
tor has a reversionary interest which is likely to take effect within ten years. I.R.C. § 673
taxes the grantor of such a trust on the income generated by the trust. The grantor, how-
ever, must also pay a gift tax on the value of the income interest transferred. Because the
trust is irrevocable, the gift is valued and taxed as a single gift. I.R.C. § 2511; Treas. Reg. §
25.2511-2(b); Lockard v. Comm'r, 166 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1948); Rohmer v. Comm'r, 21 T.C.
1099 (1954).
The grantor of a revocable trust is taxed on the income earned by the trust. I.R.C. §
676. Each payment of income to the beneficiary is taxed as a separate gift. See supra note
106.
When an individual pays another's interest obligation, that individual does so with af-
ter-tax dollars. Thus, the individual has paid income tax on the money transferred pursuant
to I.R.C. § 61. The payment of another's debt is an indirect gift, taxable to the individual
making the payment. I.R.C. § 2511 (1985); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c); see supra note 103.
Finally, the forgiveness of a borrower's interest obligation also generates a taxable gift
from the lender to the borrower. I.R.C. § 2511; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a); see supra note
105.
The lender incurs no additional income tax because of the forgiveness of the debt;
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Until section 7872, below-market loans permitted avoidance of
these rules even though they were the economic equivalent. The
exception to the de minimis rule for income-producing assets fore-
closes such avoidance. Thus, no matter how small the loan, the
lender will pay gift tax and income tax if the purpose of the loan is
to purchase or carry income-producing assets. Establishing that
the purpose of the loan is to purchase such assets may be difficult;
nevertheless, this provision enables the Service to attack the most
flagrant tax avoidance schemes.
The proposed regulations under section 7872 provide guide-
lines for establishing that a loan is directly attributable to income-
producing assets. The de minimis exception will not apply if the
loan proceeds are directly traceable to the purchase of income-pro-
ducing assets, if income-producing assets are used as collateral for
the loan, or if there is direct evidence that the loan obviated the
need to dispose of income-producing assets. 13 Income-producing
assets are limited to assets generating ordinary income such as a
business, a certificate of deposit, stock, bonds, rental property or
even a savings account.' In the only example included, a purchase
of $8,000 worth of corporate stock on June 11, 1984, is held to be
directly traceable to an interest-free loan of $8,000 on June 10,
1985.137 More attenuated arrangements will also be covered by this
exception.
Once the loan exceeds $10,000, the lender will be considered to
have made a gift equal to the foregone interest. But if the lender
has made no other gifts to the borrower in that year, section
2503(b) will exclude the first $10,000 of such gift from taxation.'
If A loans B $100,000 interest-free when the applicable statutory
rate is ten percent per year, the amount of foregone interest and,
hence, the value of the gift, is only $10,000. As long as the lender
has made no other gifts to the borrower in that year, this gift will
escape taxation. 3 9 Thus, only significant below-market loans will
trigger the gift tax. Moreover, the unified credit will defer payment
of that tax. 40
Although taxing below-market loans as gifts coincides with the
rather, he foregoes income that would have generated further income tax consequences.
135. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(3), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33564.
136. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(4), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33564.
137. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(5) (Ex. 4), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33565.
138. See supra note 116. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
139. In fact, the general practice condoned by many tax practitioners is for taxpayers
to transfer $10,000 in addition to the small birthday, wedding, and holiday gifts that I.R.C.
§ 2503(b) was intended to exempt from tax. See supra note 123.
140. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. I.R.C. § 2505(b).
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treatment of similar transactions, it does create one apparent in-
congruity. Since 1969, sections 170 and 2522 have precluded a de-
duction for the transfer to a charitable organization of the right to
use property without paying rent."' Congress feared that such a
deduction granted the taxpayer a double benefit, since the tax-
payer had already excluded the value of the rent from income. '42
With the exception of long-term capital gain property, a taxpayer's
charitable deduction is limited to his basis in the property. 43 The
rent-free use of property simply constitutes a substitute for ordi-
nary income and does not merit special tax treatment. In denying
a deduction in this area, Congress did not dispute that such cost-
free use of property amounted to a gift. Thus, denial of this deduc-
tion does not justify failure to tax the right to use money without
cost as a gift. 4
2. Income Tax
Section 7872 generates income tax as well as gift tax conse-
quences. Although it taxes demand and term loans differently for
gift tax purposes, it treats them identically for income tax pur-
poses.' 5 This treatment reflects the belief that the maturity provi-
141. I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(3)(A), 2522(c)(2).
142. S. REP. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 83, reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2027, 2113.
143. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1) provides:
GENERAL RULE-The amount of any charitable contribution of property
otherwise taken into account under this section shall be reduced by the sum of-
(A) the amount of gain which would not have been long-term capital gain if
the property contributed had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value
(determined at the time of such contribution), and
(B) in the case of a charitable contribution-
(i) of tangible personal property, if the use by the donee is unre-
lated to the purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption
under § 501 (or, in the case of a governmental unit, to any purpose or
function described in subsection (c)), or
(ii) to or for the use of a private foundation (as defined in § 509(a)),
other than a private foundation described in subsection (b)(1)(E),
40 percent (28/46 in the case of a corporation) of the amount of gain which
would have been long-term capital gain if the property contributed had been sold
by the taxpayer at its fair market value (determined at the time of such
contribution).
For purposes of applying this paragraph (other than in the case of gain to
which § 617(d)(1), 1245(a), 1250(a), 1251(c), or 1254(a) applies), property which is
property used in the trade or business (as defined in § 1231(b)) shall be treated as
a capital asset.
144. See infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text.
145. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(2) creates disparate gift tax treatment for term and demand
loans, but I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1) treats both types of loans the same for income tax purposes.
See also Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.7872-6(a), 1.7872-7(6)(b)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33563.
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sions of term loans will often be ignored within a family and that
an original issue discount analysis, required for business loans, is
unnecessary for gift loans.1 4 6
The imputed transfer of foregone interest creates income for
the borrower. Even though no money actually changes hands, re-
fraining from charging interest conveys an economic benefit to the
borrower. Such benefit produces income for the borrower the same
as the payment of the taxpayer's debt by another or the forgive-
ness of that debt by the lender."17 The refusal to impose income
tax on the receipt of below-market loans does not alter this analy-
sis, because it stems from the interest deduction rather than a
finding that the free use of money does not confer an economic
benefit on the borrower."18
The borrower, however, will not be required to include the
foregone interest in gross income if it constitutes a gift within the
meaning of section 102. Although the definition of a gift differs for
gift and income tax purposes,"'9 the same factors that support a
finding that the below-market loan is not made in the ordinary
course of business will permit exclusion under section 102.150 In-
trafamily transfers will often originate from detached and disinter-
ested generosity and, thus, escape the income tax.' Those that do
not will be the exception rather than the rule.
Excluding the amount of foregone interest from the borrower's
income promotes consistency. Outright gifts resulting from the do-
nor's income are excluded from gross income.'52 The grantor, not
the beneficiary, is taxed on the income earned by a short-term or a
revocable trust. 53 Likewise, when the owner of property attempts
to transfer the income without the underlying property, the assign-
ment of income doctrine imposes the tax on the owner, not the
recipient.""
The income tax treatment of the lender is also commensurate
with the taxation of these economically equivalent transactions. In
each of the equivalent situations, the owner of the property must
146. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1020, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 751, 1017.
147. See supra notes 103 and 105.
148. See cases cited supra note 95.
149. See cases cited supra note 42.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 42 and 80.
151. In fact, the family situation creates a presumption that the transfer is a gift. See,
e.g., Heringer v. Comm'r, 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1956); see generally 2 R. Paul, Estate and
Gift Taxation §§ 16.03, 16.06 (1942).
152. I.R.C. § 102(a).
153. I.R.C. §§ 673, 676. See also supra note 106.
154. See cases cited supra note 87.
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include the income earned from the property in his gross income.
Moreover, when A pays B's interest obligation to a third person, A
does so with after-tax dollars. Section 7872 produces the same re-
sult by treating the lender as receiving an amount equal to the
foregone interest on the last day of the year. 55 This imputed inter-
est is income to the lender.
Taxing the lender on such imputed interest income creates no
inequity. The lender has not relinquished complete control over his
money and, as owner of the property, should be taxed on the in-
come earned from the property. Any other result would sanction
income splitting and circumvent the doctrine against assignment of
income.1 51
The amount of interest imputed to the lender could be either
the income actually earned by the borrower or the income the
lender could have earned by investing his money other than in a
below-market loan. Section 7872 adopts a combination of both ap-
proaches. When the total loans between the individuals do not ex-
ceed $100,000, the lender's imputed income equals the borrower's
net investment income.157 If the borrower's net investment income
does not exceed $1,000, however, the lender will be deemed to have
no imputed income.158 When the purpose of the loan is to avoid
tax,15' for example, by shifting income to a lower bracket taxpayer,
or when the aggregate amount of loans exceeds $100,000,1e0 or
when the borrower can control the timing of investment income, 6'
the lender's income equals the amount of foregone interest.
Theoretically, the income actually earned by the borrower will
be less than what the lender could have earned. Borrowers as a
group have more limited investment opportunities given their
fewer resources. Limiting the lender's income to the amount of the
borrower's net investment income makes sense when the amount
of the loan is relatively modest. In such cases, the purpose of the
loan is most likely to assist the borrower in purchasing commodi-
ties which Congress had no intention of discouraging.' 6 2 Limiting
155. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1)(B).
156. These are the particular evils Congress intended to prevent by enacting § 7872.
See supra note 91.
157. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(A). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(c)(1), 50 Fed. Reg.
at 33565.
158. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(E)(ii). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(c)(4), 50 Fed.
Reg. at 33565.
159. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(B).
160. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(D).
161. For example, a borrower might control the timing of dividends of a closely-held
corporation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(c)(3), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33565.
162. See supra note 126.
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the amount of imputed interest income encourages lenders to make
such loans. Even if the borrower invests the loan proceeds in in-
come-producing assets, the amount of income generated is rela-
tively modest.
Once the amount of the loan becomes significant or the clear
purpose of the loan is tax avoidance, no reason exists to encourage
such transfers. Measuring the lender's income by what he could
have earned had he himself invested the money discourages these
loans and, thus, prevents tax avoidance schemes."6 3 This rule also
promotes the two basic purposes of the gift tax: prevention of in-
come and estate tax avoidance.' 6" Had the lender retained the
money and invested it himself, he would have been taxed on the
higher income actually produced and the net income would have
augmented his estate.
The deemed transfer of the amount of foregone interest pro-
duces not only imputed interest to the lender, but also an imputed
interest deduction to the borrower. Section 7872 permits the bor-
rower to deduct the amount of foregone interest under section
163(a), except in those cases where the deduction is denied. Exam-
ples are provided by sections 163(d) and 265 and the taxpayer's
failure to itemize.'68 This deduction should not be disallowed sim-
ply because no money actually changed hands. The purpose of sec-
tion 7872 is to treat the borrower as if he had actually made that
payment. If the aggregate amount of the loans between the indi-
viduals does not exceed $100,000, the borrower's interest deduction
is limited to the amount of the borrower's net investment
income. 6
This interest deduction creates an unnecessary loophole in the
case of gift loans. Such a deduction makes sense in the case of bus-
iness loans to cancel the income imputed to the borrower by sec-
tion 7872 and, thus, provides consistency to equivalent situations.
In the case of a gift loan, the borrower has no gross income pursu-
ant to section 102. Permitting a deduction simply creates an addi-
tional tax benefit to the borrower.
Allowing the borrower an interest deduction for the foregone
interest deemed transferred to the lender also creates an interest-
ing possibility for tax savings. Assume that the lender (L) is taxed
163. This is the primary thrust of Congressional intent in enacting § 7872. See supra
note 128.
164. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
165. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1)(B) creates a transfer from the borrower to the lender. I.R.C. §
7872(a)(1)(B). The proposed regulations do not mention this issue.
166. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(A).
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at twenty percent and that the borrower (B) is taxed at fifty per-
cent."'7 If L loans B $200,000, interest-free, when the applicable
federal rate is ten percent, the value of the gift from L to B is
$20,000. Because of the split gift provision,'6 8 L will suffer no gift
consequences if he is married, unless section 7872(f)(2), which
treats husbands and wives as one individual, overrides section
2513.169 B has no income due to section 102.
L must report $20,000 of imputed interest income which will
generate $4,000 of taxes. 17 0 But B will receive a $20,000 interest
deduction which will create a tax savings of $10,000.'' 1 This tax
savings will be eliminated if B invests the loan proceeds in income-
producing assets.'7 2 If instead he uses the money to pay for L's
college or graduate education, which will not create either income
or a gift to B, then B's tax saving, because of the imputed deduc-
tion, more than compensates for L's imputed interest income.
If the split gift provision 1 3 does not eliminate the gift tax be-
cause of section 7872(f)(2), the unified credit 74 will at least defer
the payment of the tax until the distant future. This same deferral
will occur if the value of the gift exceeds $20,000, for example, if L
loaned $500,000 rather than $200,000. Deferral of the gift tax cou-
pled with the tax savings to B from the imputed deduction can be
a significant advantage.
This tax advantage only exists when the aggregate of below-
market loans exceeds $100,000. Below that level, the amount of B's
net investment income limits the deduction available to B, thereby
167. Most below-market loans are made by higher bracket taxpayers, who have more
wealth to transfer, to lower bracket taxpayers rather than the reverse as suggested in this
hypothetical.
168. I.R.C. § 2513(a).
169. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(7) does not amplify the statement that a husband and wife are to
be treated as one person. This could apply simply to aggregating loans between individuals
for the purposes of I.R.C. § 7872 (c)(2) and (d)(1) or it could create an exception to the split
gift provision of I.R.C. § 2513(a). The committee reports are silent on this issue. The pro-
posed regulations do not suggest that a husband and wife will not receive the benefit of
I.R.C. § 2513 in this situation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(c), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33566.
170. L is taxed at the rate of 20 percent. Thus, $20,000 x .2 = $4,000. This calculation
ignores the effect of the progressive rates and assumes the entire $20,000 is taxed at the
same rate.
171. Since B is in the 50 percent bracket, each deduction is worth 50 percent of its
face amount. Thus, a $20,000 deduction produces a $10,000 savings. This calculation ignores
the effect of the progressive rates and assumes the entire $20,000 generates a deduction at
the same rate.
172. The income produced by B's investment will cancel B's imputed interest deduc-
tion. Nonetheless, the tax on L is still less than on B so it saves taxes to have L (the lower
bracket taxpayer) earn the income.
173. I.R.C. § 2513(a).
174. I.R.C. § 2505(a).
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diminishing the tax benefit inuring to B from the deduction. Some
tax savings will still exist, however, if B does not invest the loan
proceeds in income-producing assets. For example, assume again
that L is in the twenty percent bracket and B in the fifty percent
bracket. L loans B $100,000 when the applicable rate is ten per-
cent, and B has $5,000 of net investment income either because he
did not invest the total loan proceeds or invested them where the
rate of return was very low, for example, where the primary incen-
tive to the investor is long-term appreciation rather than a stream
of income. Although the amount of foregone interest is $10,000, L's
imputed interest income is only $5,000 due to section 7872(d)(1).
B's net investment income of $5,000 is effectively eliminated by
the imputed deduction of $5,000, leaving a total tax due of $1,000
rather than $2,000.17 If B would have invested the $100,000 in in-
come-producing assets, this tax savings is increased since B would
have had $10,000 of income with a tax due of $2,000.
In most cases, however, the borrower's imputed deduction
compensates for the interest income imputed to the lender particu-
larly since the lender is in the higher tax bracket. Moreover, al-
lowing the deduction again provides for consistent treatment of
borrowers. If B receives a loan from a third party and A makes a
gift to B of the $1,000 interest due on the loan, B will still receive
an interest deduction even though he used A's money which was
excluded from his income by section 102. On the other hand, if A
had simply paid the interest rather than giving the money to B, B
would have neither income nor a deduction since section 163(a) re-
quires that B actually pay the interest to receive the deduction.
Section 7872 cannot treat below-market loans consistent with both
situations.
Some inconsistent tax treatment will always exist given the
multiple ways of structuring transactions. Section 7872 takes an
enormous step forward in treating below-market loans consistently
with many other economically equivalent transactions. Such con-
sistency is necessary to maintain the viability of a system based on
voluntary taxpayer compliance. The perception of inequity based
on inconsistencies, particularly when such inconsistencies favor the
wealthy, undermines the effectiveness of the system. The choice of
allowing the deduction represents either an oversight due to the
comprehensiveness of the section or a reflection that the section
175. L has imputed interest income of $5,000. Since L is in the 20 percent bracket, the
tax is $5,000 x .20 or $1,000. Had L's imputed interest been the full $10,000, the tax would
have been $10,000 x .20 or $2,000. This calculation ignores the progressivity of rates and
assumes that the full amounts of income are taxed at the same rate.
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was designed to focus on the tax avoidance schemes of lenders, not
borrowers.
The tax treatment of below-market loans pursuant to section
7872 may create a significant detriment for such loans to charitable
organizations. Section 7872 applies to all gift loans, even loans be-
tween unrelated individuals. 7 -6 A transfer from a taxpayer to a
charitable organization will qualify as a gift unless the taxpayer
receives adequate consideration for the property transferred. 17
The characterization of such transfers as gifts underlies the tax de-
ductions for charitable transfers. 178 Pursuant to this analysis, a be-
low-market loan from a taxpayer to a charitable organization,
when the taxpayer receives no other consideration for the loan,
would be considered a gift loan subject to the rules of section 7872.
Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history exempt
such loans from section 7872, unless the Treasury exempts such
loans pursuant to the specific authority delegated to it by Congress
in subsection 7872(g)(1)(C).17 9
If section 7872 applies, the taxpayer may receive neither an
income tax nor a gift tax deduction for the value of the deemed
gift to the charitable organization. Since 1969, sections 170(f)(3)(A)
and 2522(c)(2) have precluded, with some exceptions, 180 deductions
for transfers of partial interests in property. 8' A court could con-
strue a below-market loan to be a partial interest in property be-
cause the taxpayer retains a remainder interest in the property
transferred: the principal amount of the loan. Treasury regulations
specifically include such loans in the definition of partial
interests." 2
Historically, Congress has not encouraged such loans to chari-
table organizations.' But the enactment of section 7872 creates
active discouragement of such loans, whether or not Congress so
intended. If the taxpayer-lender loans a charitable organization
$500,000, interest-free, payable on demand, when the applicable
interest rate is ten percent, he is deemed to make a non-deductible
176. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(b)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33560; H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1018, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 751, 1012.
177. See supra notes 44-106 and accompanying text. See also Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.7872-1(a), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33556.
178. I.R.C. §§ 170, 2522.
179. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
180. I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(3)(B) and 2522(c)(2) exclude remainder interests in personal resi-
dences or farms, undivided portions of taxpayers' entire interests in property, and qualified
conservation contributions.
181. See supra note 142.
182. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(d)(ex.3).
183. Id.
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contribution of $50,000 and receive imputed interest income of
$50,000."8 The charitable organization would have income and an
interest deduction of $50,000, which would create no tax conse-
quences because of its tax exempt status."'5
Now that section 7872 creates these tax consequences, the rea-
sons for the 1969 changes to sections 170 and 2522 disappear, at
least for below-market loans. The taxpayer-lender has income re-
sulting from the loan to balance the charitable deduction. He is no
longer treated differently than another taxpayer who earns $50,000
and transfers that money to a charitable organization. Amending
sections 170 and 2522 to permit deductions for below-market loans
to charitable organizations would simply remove the detriment to
taxpayers wishing to make such loans. Doing so would not create
any tax benefit but would simply cancel the tax consequences re-
sulting from the operation of section 7872.
Treasury has chosen to exempt a few loans to charitable orga-
nizations from the coverage of section 7872.186 This exemption ap-
plies only if the aggregate of loans to charitable organizations by
the lender do not exceed $10,000.187 This approach is consistent
with the basic purpose of section 7872 to penalize tax avoidance
schemes by taxing the economic reality of transactions and does
not require amendment of section 170 to permit a charitable de-
duction for the use of the taxpayer's money pursuant to a below-
market loan. Congressional action, of course, would be necessary to
amend section 170.188
184. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1); see supra notes 108-116 and 145-52 and accompanying text.
185. I.R.C. § 501(a) exempts § 501(c) organizations from taxation. Thus, any income,
other than unrelated business income (see I.R.C. §§ 501(b) and 511-14) does not trigger tax
for a charitable organization. Likewise, such an organization receives no benefit from a
deduction.
186. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(b) 50 Fed. Reg. at 33521; see also Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.7872-5(b)(9), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33561.
187. Id.
188. The proposed regulations suggest that a charitable deduction is available to the
lender of a below-market loan. § 1.7872-1(a) states:
All imputed transfers under § 7872 (e.g., interest, compensation, gift) are
characterized in accordance with the substance of the transaction, and except as
otherwise provided in the regulations under § 7872, are treated as so characterized
for all purposes of the Code. For example, for purposes of section 170, an inter-
est-free loan to a charity referred to in section 170 for which interest is imputed
under section 7872, is treated as an interest bearing loan coupled with periodic
gifts to the charity in the amount of the imputed transfer, for purposes of sec-
tion 170.
50 Fed. Reg. at 33556 (emphasis added).
Pursuant to I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) and Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(d) (ex.3), however, the
taxpayer-lender would not be able to claim a charitable deduction.
[Vol. 47
32
Montana Law Review, Vol. 47 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/3
GIFT LOANS
III. VALUATION
A. How to Measure
1. Gift Tax
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984, valuation created the
greatest obstacle to taxing interest-free demand loans as gifts. 189
Term loans presented few problems as courts valued them as une-
qual exchanges according to section 2512(b) and ignored the non-
quantifiable factors such as the adequacy of the security and the
financial responsibility of the makers.190 Even ignoring these fac-
tors, however, the unequal exchange theory failed to account for
demand loans, because the lender retained the right to demand re-
payment at any time. Because the gift was never completed, it
could not be taxed. 9
Section 7872(b)(1) adopts the unequal exchange theory for
term loans by treating the lender as transferring to the borrower
on the date of the loan an amount equal to the difference between
the amount received by the borrower and the present value of all
payments required to be made under the loan.192 According to sub-
section (f)(1), present value is calculated on the date of the loan
using a discount rate equal to the applicable federal rate. Thus, if
A loans B $500,000 for five years on July 1, 1984, interest-free,
with no payments due until maturity, the value of the gift is the
difference between the amount loaned ($500,000) and the present
value of receiving $500,000 in five years ($306,956.68) or
$193,043.32.
This scheme ignores the non-quantifiable factors and, thus,
minimizes the value of the gift. Because section 7872(b)(1) requires
that the calculation be made on the date of the loan, the lender
will be deemed to make only one gift even though the loan might
extend over more than one year. Because there is only one gift, the
lender will be entitled to only one annual exclusion.193 This treat-
ment of term loans is identical to the gift tax treatment of short-
term irrevocable trusts. 94
This valuation process, however, becomes complicated by the
189. Crown v. Comm'r, 585 F.2d 234.
190. Blackburn v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 204 (1953); Estate of Berkman, 38 T.C.M. (CCH)
183 (1979).
191. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
192. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-7(a)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33563.
193. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
194. A short term irrevocable trust is a gift on the date the transfer is made since the
donor-grantor gives up all power to alter the disposition of the property during the term of
the trust. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b).
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de minimis exception of section 7872(c)(2) which exempts below-
market loans if the aggregate does not exceed $10,000. If A loans B
$5,000 interest-free for five years on July 1, 1984, and there are no
other loans outstanding between A and B, neither A nor B will
suffer any tax consequences. But if A then loans B an additional
$10,000 on July 1, 1985, for one year, this second loan will trigger
section 7872 even though A charges B the applicable federal rate of
interest on this second loan. This situation presents two issues: the
date of the gift and the applicable federal rate.
The date of the gift determines when the gift must be re-
ported. There are two choices-the date of the below-market loan
or the date the de minimis exception no longer exempts that loan
from taxation. The language of subsection (b)(1), stating that the
transfer occurs on the date of the loan "or, if later, on the first day
on which this section applies to such loan," supports the second
choice. Any other choice would create significant adverse conse-
quences for A who would have failed to file a timely gift tax re-
turn.19 5 The proposed regulations follow this rationale and provide
that the gift is deemed to be made on the date section 7872 actu-
ally applies, or, in the above example, July 1, 1985.196
Although the gift occurs on the latter date, it is valued in part
as of the earlier date. Valuation depends on the present value of
the payments required by the term note. Present value, in turn,
depends on the time until repayment and the applicable rate. Sub-
section (f)(1) specifically provides that present value is to be deter-
mined on the date the loan is made. Moreover, subsection (f)(2)(A)
defines the applicable rate for term loans as the rate in effect on
the day the loan is made. These two subsections imply that the
discount rate to be used in the above example to value the gift is
the rate in effect on July 1, 1984, the date the first loan was made.
The proposed regulations adopt this view. 197
The statute does not suggest an answer to the question of
whether the present value calculation uses four years or five years.
Arguments could be made in support of either. The choice of a five
year term is appropriate because the loan was actually made in
1984 and only the de minimis exception allows the loan to escape
tax consequences. On the other hand, the choice of the four year
195. I.R.C. § 6651 imposes a penalty of five percent per month of the tax due, up to a
maximum of 25 percent for failure to file a tax return. It also imposes a five percent per
month, up to 25 percent maximum, penalty for failure to pay tax. In addition, I.R.C. § 6601
requires interest on unpaid taxes.
196. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-7(b)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33563.
197. Id.
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term is supported by the fact that section 7872 does not apply un-
til 1985. Using a five year term ignores the reality that the loan will
be repaid in four years, and section 7872 was designed to tax the
economic reality of the transaction. The proposed regulations re-
quire use of the four year term. They provide that although the
interest rate is the applicable federal rate on the date of the loan,
the term of the loan is considered to begin on the date that section
7872 actually applies to the loan.198
Once section 7872 applies to a below-market term loan, it con-
tinues to apply even though the aggregate amount of loans out-
standing might drop below $10,000.199 For example, assume that A
made the following loans to B:
Date Amount Term Rate
1/1/84 $3,000 3 years interest-free
3/1/84 $5,000 1 year applicable Federal rate
7/1/84 $1,000 2 years interest-free
1/1/85 $6,000 2 years applicable Federal rate
The 1985 loan pushes the aggregate beyond the de minimis excep-
tion and, therefore, triggers section 7872 for both the January 1,
1984, and the July 1, 1984, loans. These loans are then valued
based on the applicable federal rate on January 1, 1984, and July
1, 1984, using terms of three years and two years respectively. The
gifts are treated as occurring on January 1, 1985, and do not disap-
pear on March 1, 1985, when the $5,000 loan is repaid and the
aggregate outstanding loans again fall below $10,000.
These examples demonstrate the complexity of valuing below-
market term loans. The proposed regulations clarify some of these
uncertainties, but do not eliminate the need for taxpayer calcula-
tions by providing tables of present value. Regardless of the final
form of the regulations, the essential complexity in taxing below-
market loans will remain, because section 7872 attempts to tax
such loans as closely to their economic substance as possible and
because it encompasses al] forms of below-market loans in the
same rules.
Taxpayers can avoid some of the uncertainties created by sec-
tion 7872 by making demand rather than term loans. Instead of
forcing demand loans into the unequal exchange scheme, section
7872 treats such loans as the transfer of the right to use money
198. Id.
199. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(10). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-7(b)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. at
33564.
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rather than as the transfer of the money itself. The value of this
right is calculated every year the loan remains outstanding as sec-
tion 7872(a)(1) treats the lender as transferring to the borrower the
amount of foregone interest each year there is any foregone inter-
est. Subsection (e)(2) defines foregone interest as the excess of the
amount of interest which would have been payable on the loan if
the lender had charged the applicable federal rate over any inter-
est payable on the loan and properly allocable to such period. 0
This amount of foregone interest, then, is the amount of the gift.
For example, if A loans B $100,000 on July 1, 1984, the fore-
gone interest is $5,000, because the applicable federal rate is ten
percent." 1 If A had charged B five percent interest, the amount of
foregone interest would only have been $2,500.202 Again, the de
minimis exception complicates the valuation process. Assume that
A loans B $50,000 interest-free on January 1, B repays A $40,000
on April 1 and then A loans B an additional $90,000 interest-free
on October 1. Section 7872 would only apply from January 1 to
March 31 and from October 1 to December 31 even though there
was a below-market loan outstanding for the entire year.203 The
foregone interest, assuming interest at ten percent, is only $3,750.
Although the annual exclusion shelters him from gift tax, A must
still perform calculations to determine this. Moreover, these calcu-
lations are further complicated because the applicable federal rate
changes semi-annually. 20 4
2. Income Tax
Determining the lender's imputed interest income and the
borrower's imputed deduction also involve complexities. As with
the valuation of demand loans for gift tax purposes, these amounts
equal the amount of foregone interest.205 Section 7872 applies this
same rule to both term and demand loans on the theories that
family members may ignore the due date of term loans and that
200. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-6(c), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33563; § 1.7872-13, 50 Fed.
Reg. at 33568.
201. PuB. L. No. 98-369, § 172(c)(4) establishes the interest rate at ten percent. Ten
percent of $100,000 is $10,000, but since the loan is outstanding for only six months, only
one-half of the $10,000, or $5,000, is the amount of foregone interest.
202. Foregone interest is the amount of interest payable according to the applicable
rate less any interest actually payable. I.R.C. § 7872(e)(2). Thus, the interest at the statu-
tory rate of ten percent ($5,000) less the interest payable ($2,500) yields the amount of
foregone interest ($2,500).
203. Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(5) (ex.1), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33564.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 221-22.
205. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1), (d)(2). See also supra note 201.
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performing an original issue discount analysis for gift loans is
unnecessary. 06
Subsection (a)(1) defines both the lender's income and the
borrower's deduction as the amount of foregone interest, however,
only if the aggregate amount of the loans outstanding between the
two individuals exceeds $100,000. Otherwise, both the lender's in-
come and the borrower's deduction are limited to the borrower's
net investment income.2 °7 Moreover, even this amount is irrelevant
if the borrower's net investment income is less than $1,000 or if the
total loans outstanding do not exceed $10,000.2 °0
This exception allowing the borrower and lender to disregard
the actual amount of foregone interest does not apply, however, if
a principal purpose of the loan is tax avoidance.0 9 It also does not
apply where the borrower can, and does, manipulate the timing of
receipt of investment income, for example, by controlling when a
closely-held corporation issues a dividend.21 ° These exceptions to
the exception further implement Congressional intent to prevent
tax avoidance schemes.
If A loans B $8,000 on July 1, 1984, interest-free and payable
on demand, neither A nor B will suffer any tax consequences. If A
then loans B an additional $7,000 on October 1, 1984, the foregone
interest for the year is only $375. If B has net investment income
of $1,000 or less, A will have no imputed interest income and B will
receive no deduction. If B's net investment income exceeds $1,000,
A's income and B's deduction will be $375.
If instead, A loans B $90,000 on July 1, 1984, the amount of
foregone interest is $4,500. If B's net investment income is only
$1,500, A's income and B's deduction equal $1,500. But if B's net
investment income is $5,000, A must report the full $4,500 as in-
come, and B may claim an interest deduction of $4,500.
Once the outstanding loans aggregate more than $100,000,
however, the ceiling established by B's net investment income dis-
appears."' If A makes a series of loans to B, the valuation calcula-
tions become more complex. For example, if A loans B $90,000 on
July 1, 1984, and then an additional $50,000 on October 1, 1984,
206. See supra note 146.
207. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(c), 50 Fed. Reg. at
33565.
208. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2), (d)(1)(E). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b), (c)(4), 50
Fed. Reg. at 33564-65.
209. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(B); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(c)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. at
33565.
210. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(c)(3), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33565.
211. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(D).
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the amount of foregone interest for the year is $5,750.212 The net
investment income limitation will not apply after October 1, but it
will apply prior to that date because subsection (d)(1)(D) provides
that this exception shall apply to any day on which the aggregate
of loans does not exceed $100,000.
In determining A's income and B's deduction, the question is
whether to determine B's net investment income for the July 1 to
October 1 period, or whether to use B's annual net investment in-
come as the ceiling for the foregone interest attributable to the
July 1 to October 1 period. Apparently A can then ignore the fore-
gone interest attributable to the July 1 to October 1 period if B's
net investment income for the year is less than $1,000. Of course, B
loses his interest deduction under this analysis. If B's net invest-
ment income for the year is $5,000, only $1,250 of it attributable to
the July 1 to October 1 period, the logical choice would be to limit
the amount of foregone interest for July 1 to October 1 to $1,250.
The total foregone interest would be this $1,250 plus the interest
attributable to the October 1-December 31 period, $3,500, or
$4,750. The language of subsection (d)(1)(A), "the borrower's net
investment income for the year," suggests a contrary result. This
would mean that the foregone interest for the year would be
$5,750,213 rather than $4,750. Thus, once A's loans to B exceed the
$100,000 limit at any time within the year, the benefit of subsec-
tion (d)(1)(A) is lost.
The proposed regulations require that the entire amount of
the borrower's net investment income be taken into account and
not prorated.214 This interpretation is consistent both with a literal
reading of section 7872 and Congressional intent to curtail tax
avoidance schemes using below-market loans.
These complicated rules further reflect the attempt to penalize
avoidance schemes and to tax all loans as realistically as possible.
Such complexity may well discourage below-market loans or at
least the reporting of such loans. At a minimum, complicated cal-
culations will increase taxpayer error and increase the cost of en-
212. The foregone interest on the July 1, 1984, loan is ten percent of $90,000 divided
by the one-half year it remains outstanding. (.10 x $90,000)/2 $4,500. The foregone inter-
est on the October 1, 1984 loan is ten percent of $50,000 divided by the one-fourth year it
remains outstanding. (.10 x $50,000)/4 = $1,250. The total foregone interest is thus $4,500
plus $1,250, or $5,750.
213. If A and B must use the full $5,000 net investment income, rather than the $1,250
attributable to the July 1 to October 1 period, the foregone interest for the July 1 to Octo-
ber 1 period is ($90,000 x .10)/4 = $2,250. This plus the foregone interest on $150,000
(which is ($140,000 x .10)/4 = $3,500) is the foregone interest for
the year ($2,250 plus $3,500 = $5,750.)
214. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(c)(5), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33565.
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forcement. Since such complexity begins when loans aggregate
more than $100,000, such discouragement is perhaps justified. The
purpose of such loans is not to assist the borrower in purchasing a
house or a car, but to assist him in his own investments or simply
to shift income to him. 5 Such loans should be taxed as close to
economic reality as possible. If that means the taxpayer must com-
pile detailed records and engage an accountant, then the taxpayer
should bear such costs.
B. The Applicable Federal Rate
Complexity continues in determining the appropriate rate for
valuing below-market loans. In Dickman, the Supreme Court did
not reach the valuation issue, but stated that the gift tax was to be
imposed on the reasonable value of the use of the money.216 The
reasonable value of the use of money depends on whether the issue
is how much the lender could earn by investing his money or how
much the borrower must pay an independent party to borrow that
money. If the focus is on the lender, then the amount of money
available to invest, the degree of liquidity required, and the degree
of risk determine the rate of return, or value, to the lender of the
use of his money. On the other hand, if the focus is on the bor-
rower, then the value of the use of the money will depend on the
borrower's financial responsibility, who the lender is, the purpose
of the loan, and the security given for it. Whichever point of view
is adopted, valuation will be unique to each loan given the differ-
ent factual situations.
Section 7872 ignores these differences and bases the value of
all below-market loans on the applicable federal rate as defined in
section 1274(d). This section, new in the Tax Reform Act of
1984, reflects Congress' attempt to realistically tax all situations
involving the time value use of money. This section provides for
three different rates depending on the term of the loan. The short-
term rate applies to loans of three years or less and is based on the
average market yield during the preceding six months of outstand-
ing marketable United States' obligations with remaining periods
to maturity of three years or less.2 18 The mid-term rate, which ap-
plies to loans of three to nine years, and the long-term rate, which
215. See supra note 85.
216. Dickman v. Comm'r, 104 S. Ct. at 1094.
217. § 7872(d)(1) exempts loans aggregating less than $100,000 from resort to §
1274(d) and requires instead a calculation of the borrower's net investment income. See
supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
218. I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(D)(i).
1986]
39
Willbanks: Interest-free Loans Are No Longer Free: Tax Consequences of Gift Loans
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
applies to loans of more than nine years, are established according
to similar rules."'9 Only the short-term rate will apply to demand
loans, because the length of the term is unknown. Demand loans
are, thus, treated as if they are renegotiated annually.
These rates reflect the choice of valuing the gift or income
produced based on the lender's investment opportunities rather
than the cost of borrowing. The amounts being taxed-the gift
from the lender to the borrower and the lender's imputed interest
income-dictate this choice. The purposes of section 7872, to pre-
vent avoidance of the income and estate taxes by the lender, focus
on the lender's ability to earn money rather than the cost of credit
to the borrower. This justifies the choice of rates.
Section 1274(d) also requires semi-annual adjustment of the
applicable rates.220 This requirement coincides with the adjust-
ment of rates under other Code sections 22' and reflects the general
thrust of those sections of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 attempting
to accurately reflect the time value of the use of money. But this
readjustment presents unnecessary complexity for the valuation of
demand loans. Both the gift and the income tax are imposed on
the amount of foregone interest deemed transferred from the
lender to the borrower. If the loan remains outstanding for a full
calendar year, the lender must use two rates of interest to calculate
the amount of foregone interest. This doubles the opportunity for
taxpayer error. Because taxpayers must calculate both income and
gifts annually, an annual adjustment to the applicable rate would
be sufficient to reflect changing conditions. A higher rate of inter-
est rather than semi-annual adjustments could compensate for lost
revenue and discourage tax avoidance loans.
The semi-annual adjustments will not affect the valuation of
term loans for gift tax purposes, because these loans are valued at
the date of the loan. But sufficient complexity is created by the
requirement that the applicable federal rate for term loans be com-
pounded semi-annually.222 Compounding the interest semi-annu-
ally produces a more accurate estimate of an investor's rate of re-
turn and will increase the revenue generated by section 7872. But
the price will be taxpayer error and confusion. For example, a loan
of less than six months would require only simple interest since the
219. Id.
220. I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(B), (C).
221. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 483, 468, 1274(d), 6621. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 imposed
semi-annual adjustments for § 483 interest rates, PUB. L. No. 98-369, § 41(b), and created
new code §§ 468 and 1274(d), PUB. L. No. 98-369, §§ 41(b), 91(b).
222. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2).
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compounding is to occur only semi-annually. The Service will need
to issue two sets of tables to assist taxpayers in this valuation pro-
cess. These tables must either be updated every six months as new
rates are issued or include a broad range of rates to accommodate
expected changes.
Determining the lender's imputed interest income from a term
loan raises additional issues. Although subsection (a)(1) treats
term and demand loans identically, the amount of foregone inter-
est may not be the same. Subsection (f)(2) defines the applicable
rate for term loans differently from that for demand loans. The
language of section 7872 suggests that the foregone interest attrib-
utable to a term loan is to be calculated on an annual basis using
the semi-annually compounded rate in effect on the date the loan
was made.
The proposed regulations provide some guidance in valuing
below-market loans. First, they focus on the need to impose the
tax in the most economically realistic manner by prescribing alter-
nate rates based on annual compounding, quarterly compounding,
and the like rather than the semi-annual compounding inherent in
the statutorily-defined applicable federal rates. 22s Taxpayers must
use the rate which most closely reflects the payment interval or
interest compounding required by the terms of the below-market
loan. Second, the proposed regulations permit taxpayers to value
below-market loans using the lower of (1) the federal statutory rate
or (2) the alternate federal rate issued by the Commissioner.22'
If a demand loan remains outstanding for an entire year, the
proposed regulations allow the taxpayer to compute foregone inter-
est only once using a "blended annual rate" of interest.225 If the
demand loan is outstanding for a semi-annual period, the taxpayer
may calculate the interest assuming daily compounding of interest,
or if the amount of the loan does not exceed $250,000, the taxpayer
may approximate the interest by the following formula: interest =
(principal amount) x (applicable federal rate)/2 x (portion of semi-
annual period loan is outstanding). 26 If the loan is outstanding
during more than one semi-annual period,22  the taxpayer must
223. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(b), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33558.
224. Id. If interest rates decrease over the six-month period, the taxpayer benefits
from using the alternate rates on a monthly basis, if interest rates increase the statutory
rate remains lower over the six-month period.
225. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13(a), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33568.
226. Id. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13(b), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33568.
227. The first semi-annual period is always January 1 to June 30 and the second is
July 1 to December 31. Thus, a below-market loan outstanding from June 1 to July 30
requires two separate calculations.
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calculate the interest in two steps even under the approximate
method."2 8 If a demand loan has a fluctuating balance, each in-
crease is treated as a new loan and each decrease as first a repay-
ment of interest and then a repayment of principal.229
The valuation provisions of section 7872 and the proposed reg-
ulations reflect the general movement away from simple, easy to
apply rules with safe havens2 30 in the attempt to accurately tax the
time value of the use of money. In doing so they reduce taxpayer
compliance, increase enforcement costs, undermine taxpayer coop-
eration, and contradict the general theme of simplification pro-
claimed by current tax reformers. Taxpayer avoidance schemes,
current economic circumstances, and the need to provide equity
between similarly situated taxpayers justify some complexity.
Compounding interest rates and requiring semi-annual adjust-
ments, however, result in excessive complexity. Higher rates and
annual adjustments can compensate for lost revenue and eliminate
much of the confusion caused by section 7872.
IV. RETROACTIVITY
Section 7872 applies only to term loans made, renegotiated,
extended or revised after June 6, 1984, and to demand loans out-
standing after that date but not repaid within sixty days of the
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1984.231 This simple provision
masks an important issue-whether to permit existing below-mar-
ket loans to escape taxation. Although the conference committee
specifically refused to decide this issue,232 failure to provide relief
ensured taxation.
Taxpayers' arguments against taxation focus on the inequity
and the administrative nightmare created by taxing existing
loans.2 3 They assert that taxing such loans contradicts thirty-four
years of practice by the Service not to tax these loans as gifts.
They claim that reliance on this practice was justified, particularly
because Congress failed to amend the gift tax after Johnson. More-
over, they contend that retroactive application of Dickman will
228. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13(b), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33568.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 483 (1982) (prior to the changes enacted by the Tax Reform Act
of 1984).
231. PUB. L. No. 98-369, § 172(c)(1), (2). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-1(b)(4),
50 Fed. Reg. at 33557.
232. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1025, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 711, 1027.
233. See, e.g., March 13, 1984, letter from Bryle M. Abhin of Arthur Anderson & Co.
to Senator Robert Dole reported at 23 T.N. 92 (Westlaw).
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place the greatest burden on middle-income taxpayers since
wealthy taxpayers can afford to repay their loans quickly. Finally,
taxpayers argue that the cumulative nature of the gift tax, with the
unified credit and progressive rates dependent on prior events,
mandates relief.
The Service, however, has announced that it will apply Dick-
man to existing loans where the value of the gift exceeds the
amount of the annual exclusion, and loans where the balance does
not exceed $50,000 for a single person or $100,000 for a married
couple.2 34 Although the Service has not officially announced that it
will also collect income tax from borrowers of existing loans, it has
asserted that position in litigation for years2 35 and will most likely
continue to do so given the enactment of section 7872.
Relieving individuals from the tax consequences of existing
below-market loans will not only reduce government revenues, but
will also undermine both the validity of the Dickman decision and
section 7872. The administrative nightmare described by taxpayers
should vanish in light of the exclusions announced by the Service.
Moreover, short shrift should be given to taxpayer claims of reli-
ance on existing administrative practice, since this argument dis-
torts the Service's position on the taxability of below-market loans.
The issue in Johnson v. United States,23 whether to tax in-
terest-free demand loans as gifts, was one of first impression, al-
though the Service had consistently argued for taxation of analo-
gous transfers in other cases. For example, in Blackburn v.
Commissioner237 it asserted that a low-interest term loan resulted
in a gift. It had also won cases imposing income tax on recipients
of the right to use property rent-free. 23 Further, it continued to
claim that interest-free loans conferred income on the borrower de-
spite repeatedly losing in the courts.239
The Service's strategy in other cases, however, may have cre-
ated confusion for taxpayers. In Hunkele v. Commissioner,2 0 the
Service apparently failed to argue that an interest-free term note
had a value less than its face amount which would have increased
the amount of the gift. This failure could have been due to any
number of factors including the low interest rates that prevailed
234. I.R.S. Announcement 84-60, 1984-23 I.R.B. 58.
235. See cases cited supra note 95.
236. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
237. 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
238. See cases cited supra note 93.
239. See cases cited supra note 95.
240. 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 26 (1944).
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until the 1960s.24' More importantly, however, the Service claimed
that the right to use property rent-free was not a property right
sufficient to permit the owner a charitable deduction.242 On the
other hand, the Service consistently lost those cases, and Congress
finally resolved the controversy on a different basis.243 The Ser-
vice's position on the taxability of below-market loans can best be
described as uncertain, particularly as it never issued a ruling or
regulation exempting interest-free loans from tax.
Had the Service published such a ruling or regulation, it might
still have altered that position, even retroactively. 244 This right re-
flects the fact that Congress, not the Service, prescribes the tax
laws. The Service possesses only the force Congress chooses to give
it. When Congress has not adopted the Service's position explic-
itly, the Service may alter its interpretation of the law. This is pos-
sible because no individual Commissioner can bind the government
to an erroneous interpretation of the law.245
Only due process limits the Service's ability to change its in-
terpretation retroactively.246 In cases where courts have rejected
retroactive change, taxpayers had dealt directly with the Service
and relied on the response obtained in structuring future transac-
tions.247 In such cases the Service's change of position created a
241. Interest rates on short-term business loans from 1931 through 1966 were as
follows:
1931 4.3 1943 2.6 1955 3.7
1932 4.7 1944 2.4 1956 4.2
1933 4.3 1945 2.2 1957 4.6
1934 3.5 1946 2.1 1958 4.3
1935 2.9 1947 2.1 1959 5.0
1936 2.7 1948 2.5 1960 5.2
1937 2.6 1949 2.7 1961 5.0
1938 2.5 1950 2.7 1962 5.0
1939 2.1 1951 3.1 1963 5.0
1940 2.1 1952 3.5 1964 5.0
1941 2.0 1953 3.7 1965 5.1
1942 2.2 1954 3.6 1966 6.0
Source: Table Series X 466-73, U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the
United States from Colonial Times to 1970 (1975).
242. See cases cited supra note 97.
243. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
244. I.R.C. § 7805(b).
245. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965); Automobile Club of Michigan v.
Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939).
246. Id.; see also Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. United States, 476 F.2d 406 (4th Cir.
1973); Schuster v. Comm'r, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962); LeSavoy Foundation v. Comm'r,
238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956); Newman v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 219 (1974).
247. See, e.g., Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. United States, 476 F.2d 406 (4th Cir.
1973); Schuster v. Comm'r, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962); LeSavoy Foundation v. Comm'r,
238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956); Newman v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 219 (1974).
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significant detriment due to reliance on determinations received
from the Service.2 48 Such is not the case with interest-free demand
loans. Taxpayers simply relied on their understanding of existing
law and acted accordingly, hoping to avoid taxation. No taxpayer
has a vested interest in the continued existence of tax laws, let
alone the Service's apparent interpretation of those laws. Relying
on the failure of the Service to collect gift tax on interest-free de-
mand loans prior to Johnson, therefore, does not justify retroactive
relief.
To provide such relief would be tantamount to applying Dick-
man only prospectively. This happens only if the decision estab-
lishes a new principle of law or if retroactive application would in-
hibit the operation of the rule announced in the decision or create
significant inequity.24 None of these factors would have permitted
the taxpayers in Dickman to escape taxation and precludes grant-
ing relief to other taxpayers.
A decision establishes a new principle of law either by overrul-
ing clear past precedent or deciding a case of first impression.2 50
Dickman did neither. Although Dickman was a case of first im-
pression in the Supreme Court and did overrule Johnson and
Crown on the precise issue of imposing the gift tax on interest-free
demand loans, the result in Dickman followed a long line of cases
imposing gift tax on every gratuitous transfer, including low-inter-
est term loans.25 1 Given the statute, regulations, legislative history,
and prior case law, taxpayers should have anticipated the Dickman
decision.
Moreover, the very purpose of the gift tax-to prevent avoid-
ance of income and estate taxes-requires taxation of existing
loans. 52 Providing retroactive relief would promote taxpayer reli-
ance on favorable court decisions inadequately grounded in the
Code. Further, it would require the Service either to litigate the
case to the Supreme Court regardless of the amount or issues at
stake, or to seek legislative relief from every unfavorable decision.
This policy would unnecessarily deplete government resources and
complicate the gift tax provisions which were drafted as simply as
possible to provide flexibility in meeting changing conditions.
Finally, any inequity caused by applying Dickman retroac-
248. Id.
249. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971); see generally Corr, Retro-
activity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied", 61 N.C.L. REV. 745 (1983).
250. Id.
251. See cases cited supra notes 65-81, 92.
252. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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tively is diminished, if not eliminated, by the administrative excep-
tions announced by the Service. In fact, applying the decision to
existing loans creates both horizontal and vertical equity. Horizon-
tal equity is achieved because similar transactions are taxed in the
same way.25 Vertical equity is achieved because wealthy taxpayers,
who are more likely to have made interest-free demand loans in
excess of the. announced exclusions in efforts to avoid taxes, are
better able to bear the burden of taxation.' 4 In addition, the
wealthy are more likely to make gifts in any form and to make
interest-free loans rather than outright gifts.
These same justifications would have allowed Congress to ap-
ply section 7872 to existing loans rather than choosing a June 6,
1984, effective date. Taxation raises revenue and apportions the
cost of government rather than eliminating individual rights or
remedies. For this reason, courts rarely invalidate statutes for im-
posing taxes retroactively. 55 In reaching this decision, courts again
review the foreseeability of the measure, the likelihood that the
taxpayer would have changed his position had he known of the
measure, and the novelty of the tax imposed.2 5' An analysis of
these factors would have permitted retroactive application of sec-
tion 7872.
The gift tax is not new. It surfaced briefly in 1924 and became
a permanent part of the tax structure in 1932.257 Applying it to
below-market loans was predictable. The Supreme Court had con-
sistently interpreted the gift tax broadly to effectuate its purposes
of preventing the avoidance of income and estate taxes. 58 Other
than the charitable deduction cases, the Service had always at-
tempted to tax the cost-free use of property. Although the lower
courts refused to impose tax on interest-free demand loans,2 5 tax-
253. Horizontal equity requires that persons in similar situations pay similar amounts
of tax and is the most widely accepted notion of fairness in taxation. Graetz, Legal Transi-
tions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 79 (1977).
254. Vertical equity is simply a different approach to the equality issue embedded in
the concept of horizontal equity. Vertical equity requires unequal taxation of persons based
on their ability to pay. Id. at 81.
255. See United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981); MacLaughlin v. Alliance
Ins. Co., 286 U.S. 244 (1932); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); Tyee
Realty Co. v. Anderson, 240 U.S. 115 (1916).
256. Id.
257. See supra note 84.
258. See, e.g., Jewett v. Comm'r, 455 U.S. 305 (1982); Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S.
184 (1943); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943); Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393
(1941); Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S.
280 (1933).
259. See cases cited supra note 16.
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payers were warned by the views of dissenting justices ' and com-
mentators of the possibility of taxation. 26 ' Given the conflict that
developed in the courts, it was inevitable that Congress would act.
The likelihood of taxing below-market loans exceeded the possibil-
ity of exempting such loans from taxation given the precedent, the
size of the federal deficit, and the current movement toward broad-
ening the tax base.
Determining whether or not taxpayers would have changed
their conduct had they realized the imminence of section 7872 re-
quires inquiry into individual cases. Wise tax counsel advised cli-
ents to be wary. Although taxpayers are more likely to refrain from
making gifts than from receiving income, many taxpayers would
probably have made below-market loans even had they known of
Congress' intentions. Taxpayers continue to make gifts despite the
existence of the gift tax, because they are motivated by nontax
considerations. Only taxpayers who made such loans explicitly to
shift income or avoid taxes would have refrained from making such
loans. Providing retroactive relief, solely because some taxpayers
would not have engaged in tax avoidance behavior, would en-
courage exactly the behavior section 7872 attempts to prohibit.
Failing to make section 7872 retroactive to the date of Dick-
man, coupled with relief from the application of Dickman to ex-
isting loans, would also reward taxpayers who sought to second-
guess Congress on this issue by making below-market loans be-
tween the date of the Dickman decision and the effective date of
section 7872. Relieving these taxpayers of the tax burden would
260. Crown v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 1060, 1065 (Simpson, J., dissenting) aff'd, 585 F.2d
234, 241 (7th Cir. 1978) (Van Pelt, J., dissenting).
261. See, e.g., Perlman, Interest-Free Loans: Recent Installments, 17 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 71 (1983); Mandleman & Heber, Interest Free Loans: The Gift and Estate Tax Plan-
ners' Dream - Are We About to be Awakened? 65 MARQ. L. REv. 367 (1982); Duvall, The
"Lester Crown" Affair, 5 REV. OF TAx. OF IND. 34 (1981); Joyce & Cotto, Interest-Free
Loans: The Odyssey of a Misnomer, 35 TAx L. REV. 459 (1980); Pulliam, Income and Gift
Tax Implications of Nonbusiness Interest-Free Loans: Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth,
58 Taxes 675 (1980); Hooton, Gift Tax Analysis of Non-Interest Bearing Loans, 54 Taxes
635 (1976); Feinschreiber & Granwell, IRS Imputes Interest on Loans Between Family
Members, 51 Taxes 294 (1973); Note, Gift Tax Implications of an Interest-Free Loan, 42
ALB. L. REV. 471 (1978); Note, The Value of the Use of Money Loaned by Taxpayers to
Their Children without Interest Does Not Constitute a Gift, 5 Hous. L. REV. 138 (1967);
Note, Gift Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 19 STAN. L. REV. 870 (1967); Comment, Gift
Tax Consequences of Interest-Free Loans Between Family Members, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV.
139 (1979); Comment, Tax Consequences of an Interest Free Loan, 24 Loy. L. REV. 33
(1978); Comment, An Interest-Free Borrower or Lender Be: Gift Tax Implications of Inter-
est-Free Loans, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 941 (1978); Comment, Interest-Free Loans and the Gift
Tax: "Crown v. Commissioner", 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 903 (1977); Comment, "Crown v. Commis-
sioner": Gift Taxation and Interest-Free Loans Among Family Members, 19 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 361 (1977).
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have promoted avoidance of the gift tax itself as well as frustrated
the gift tax objectives of preventing evasion of income and estate
taxes.
Refraining from granting retroactive relief does not thwart ex-
pectations or undermine stability.2 6 2 Taxpayers could not have re-
alistically expected Congress or the courts to leave the loophole
created by Johnson and Crown open forever. Moreover, taxing ex-
isting loans promotes consistency within the tax system and dis-
courages taxpayer reliance on dubious schemes to avoid taxes.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 7872 finally resolves much of the controversy sur-
rounding below-market loans. Although it correctly creates both
income tax and gift tax consequences for such loans, its coverage is
apparently limited to the transfer of money between individuals.
Similar tax avoidance can be achieved through the transfer of the
right to use any type of property cost-free. If the courts refuse to
extend the principles of section 7872 to such cases, Congress will
need to amend section 7872.
Section 7872 must be welcomed for producing consistency by
treating below-market loans similarly to short-term trusts, revoca-
ble trusts, and payment or forgiveness of a borrower's interest obli-
gation. It exacts a price for this, however. Including both the gift
tax and the income tax consequences of all below-market loans in
the same Code section creates unnecessary complexity. The at-
tempt to tax below-market loans with as much economic realism as
possible cannot justify this. Choosing a higher rate of interest
would raise sufficient revenue and would discourage taxpayer
abuse.
Possibly the regulations will resolve some of the complexities
and uncertainties and enable the Secretary to frustrate attempts to
circumvent section 7872. But the regulation process is slow, and
the regulations themselves often tend to merely reiterate statutory
language and committee reports without providing the necessary
guidance through examples. Section 7872, therefore, will most
likely achieve its purpose of discouraging below-market loans.2"3
262. See Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revi-
sion, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977); Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality
of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960); Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxa-
tion, 48 HARV. L. REV. 592, 597 (1935); Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 TEx.
L. REV. 409 (1928.
263. Minutes of the August 3, 1984, Meeting of the A.B.A. Section of Taxation Com-
mittee on Estate and Gift Taxes.
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